Actively exploited Security news

UAT-12643: Overlord RAT reads its command server address from Solana transactions while a stealer grabs crypto and passwords

On 18 November 2026 Cisco Talos published an analysis of a financially motivated group it tracks as UAT-12643. Using shortcut (LNK) files disguised as PDFs, HTA files and abused MSBuild projects, it drops three tools on Windows machines: the Overlord remote access trojan, a repurposed open-source "Good Game" stealer and a clipboard hijacker that swaps crypto wallet addresses. Overlord RAT pulls its command-and-control address from encrypted memos in Solana blockchain transactions, so the operator can change it without shipping new malware – and defenders have nothing to take down.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 5 minutes · For admins and analysts

Actively exploited: UAT-12643

Key points

  • Who: UAT-12643, a financially motivated group. Talos assesses with low confidence that it is North Korea-aligned, based on overlapping tradecraft and the Overlord RAT – which other actors use too.
  • Initial access: LNK files posing as PDFs (downloading via the signed MpCmdRun.exe or certutil), HTA files run by mshta, and MSBuild projects compiling C# in memory. Talos did not see how the lures reach victims.
  • What it steals: passwords and cookies from 23 browsers, Discord and Roblox tokens, 21 crypto wallets, gaming accounts and documents matched by English, French, Spanish and Portuguese keywords. Data goes to GoFile and a Discord webhook.
  • What is new: Overlord RAT looks up its C2 address in Memo data of Solana transactions. A blockchain cannot be switched off or seized, so Talos recommends behavioural detection over domain blocklists.

What happened

Cisco Talos published its analysis of UAT-12643 on 18 November 2026. Talos describes a financially motivated actor that likely targets victims in Europe: crypto holders and gamers, finance and accounting staff (lured with a fake financial statement PDF), Viber users (a trojanised installer) and call centres running the MicroSIP softphone.

Talos links the group to North Korea with low confidence and notes that its main tool, Overlord RAT, and the blockchain trick are also used by other actors.

Much of the infrastructure was mapped thanks to an operator mistake: the server at 41[.]216[.]188[.]11 exposed its root directory of payloads.

How the attack works

Talos observed three lure types. It did not see how they are delivered (email, web or chat).

  • LNK shortcut posing as a PDF. One variant downloads its payload with Microsoft Defender's signed MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile and saves it as RuntimeBroker.exe; another uses certutil -urlcache -f.
  • HTA file run by mshta.exe, which downloads the payload to %TEMP%\s.exe and launches it hidden.
  • MSBuild project (dl.xml) with inline C# that compiles and runs in memory, spoofing a BITS user agent when downloading.

The lure then fetches one of three tools:

  1. Overlord RAT – a Go remote access trojan with 35 commands (surveillance, files, processes, scripts, a reverse SOCKS proxy for lateral movement, in-memory plugins).
  2. "Good Game" stealer 1.1.2 – an open-source Python infostealer packed with PyInstaller. It takes data from 23 browsers, Discord and Roblox tokens, 21 crypto wallets, gaming launchers and keyword-matched documents, zips it as SK_<random>.zip, uploads it to GoFile and announces it through a Discord webhook.
  3. Clipboard hijacker written in C++ – checks the clipboard every 500 ms and replaces any copied crypto wallet address with the attacker's.
How Overlord RAT finds its C2 server through the Solana blockchain1. The operator sends a transaction from their wallet with an encrypted server address in the Memo field; 2. Overlord RAT reads the wallet's transactions through Solana's public API (getSignatures, getTransaction); 3. It picks the memo that is exactly 43 characters long and decrypts a WebSocket URL from it (AES-256); 4. It connects and waits for commands; a new address only needs a new transaction, not new malware1The operator sends a transaction fromtheir wallet with an encrypted serveraddress in the Memo field2Overlord RAT reads the wallet'stransactions through Solana's publicAPI (getSignatures, getTransaction)3It picks the memo that is exactly 43characters long and decryptsa WebSocket URL from it (AES-256)4It connects and waits for commands;a new address only needs a newtransaction, not new malware
Overlord RAT's command channel via Solana transaction memos (per Cisco Talos)

Why blockchains make "bulletproof dead drops"

In a separate post the same day, Talos explains why malware control is moving onto public blockchains (Bitcoin, EVM smart contracts, TRON, Solana). On-chain data cannot be deleted or seized, and malware only reads it over JSON-RPC, so the chain itself records nothing about infected machines. Talos recommends:

  • moving from domain blocklists to behavioural detection,
  • restricting outbound traffic to public blockchain RPC providers where there is no business need,
  • alerting on unusually frequent RPC calls and long encoded responses,
  • prioritising endpoint telemetry that catches in-memory decryption.

Who is affected

Home users with crypto and gaming accounts, accounting staff who open invoices and statements from attachments, and organisations with call centres. For defenders the key point is that all three lures abuse legitimate Windows binaries (MpCmdRun, certutil, mshta, MSBuild), so file-based antivirus may miss them.

How to tell if you've been hit

Indicators from Talos's report and IOC repository (defanged, ready to paste into rules):

41[.]216[.]188[.]11   (ports 8000, 5173, 5656, 5959)
b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c  Overlord RAT
16622bb8df60403217ccf8e326e2e9e718e01c85d7b52fe5c5e1cf44d62d25c8  Good Game Stealer
b0b636f5c7e40af94aacf9ebd9a696dac57debcd628127414248908562380d33  Good Game Stealer (Python script)
5a52d6773840fd5ab45d781d572d9fbd6a8dacb08dcda65036ce8b28548a5224  Good Game Stealer
f1e5174084bfded283b9dcf081615478e6941d12b652793197556beb72cc7588  clipboard hijacker
f7951b11be06d59a3e8fdd9bde4f19869978de8385c9107129c635b2cdba5082  LNK generator
19ca4e0e8e7dd62d130afbfed49646f1566dce2633cf937b848d990da3e3e9a2  dl.xml
1b268a08e83839f6e89acf0987657776398de2ba5a323b04b1dd3925ce3a5b45  document.lnk
c8f9ce4b58acec3ce5640041cbc6d4802e30b2dded4a88766ee2de2cefde45f7  payload.hta
eb5730784e7d63e1fe38a0bc28be8f2210666662e9a660efcc3282f0489ef870  payment-invoice.pdf.lnk
68786345f67152eb0d52bb198b5904924cfbdbf50c078432e5329e5d02fc6659  Viber.lnk

Other traces according to Talos:

  • Registry (HKCU\…\Run): values Zoipers and MsgEdgeUpdate; a DisableTaskMgr setting.
  • Files and paths: %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe, %TEMP%\s.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe outside C:\Windows\System32, changes under %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\ (ResetConfig.xml).
  • Mutex: UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc.
  • Network: uploads to upload[.]gofile[.]io/uploadFile, lookups to ipwhois.app, Discord webhooks from workstations, and Solana public RPC calls from processes that have nothing to do with crypto.
  • Processes: MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile, certutil -urlcache -f, mshta.exe fetching from the internet, MSBuild.exe launched from a user profile.

Talos released ClamAV signatures (for example Win.Trojan.OverlordRAT-10060615-0, Win.Infostealer.GoodGame-10060617-0, Win.Trojan.WalletClipper-10060621-0) and Snort rules (SIDs 1:67490, 1:67491; Snort 3 7:74, 7:75). Pull hashes and IPs out of your own logs with our IOC extractor.

What to do

  1. Block the IP address and hashes above in EDR, firewalls and proxies, and hunt across workstations for the past few weeks.
  2. Use ASR rules or WDAC to restrict mshta.exe, MSBuild.exe and downloads through certutil and MpCmdRun for ordinary users.
  3. Where the business does not use crypto, block public blockchain RPC endpoints, GoFile uploads and Discord webhooks.
  4. On a hit, reimage the machine (Overlord RAT survives a reset via Recovery\OEM), change every password stored in browsers, revoke sessions and move funds from affected wallets to a new wallet.
  5. Home users: never open a "PDF" that has a shortcut icon or extension (.pdf.lnk), and always double-check a pasted wallet address before sending crypto.

Timeline

  • March 2026 – an earlier report on Lazarus described a similar Solana C2 technique (implemented in Node.js at the time, per Talos).
  • June 2026 – Overlord RAT reported in use by the UNK_DeadDrop actor.
  • 18 Nov 2026 – Cisco Talos publishes its UAT-12643 analysis with IOCs and detections.

Updates

  • 18 Nov 2026 – first version of this article.

FAQ

Is North Korea behind this?

Talos only says so with low confidence. It points to tradecraft overlaps with other North Korean groups and to the Overlord RAT having been used by UNK_DeadDrop, an actor it considers likely North Korean. It also stresses that both the Overlord RAT and the Solana technique are used by non-DPRK actors. Either way, the campaign is financially motivated.

Why is blockchain-based C2 a problem for defenders?

A normal C2 server sits behind a domain or IP address that can be blocked or seized. Blockchain transactions are replicated across thousands of nodes and nobody can delete them. The malware only reads them through public interfaces (getSignatures, getTransaction), so it leaves no trace on the chain. The operator changes the server address with a new transaction and existing infections pick it up on their own.

How does Overlord RAT persist?

Talos describes three methods: a value under the registry Run key, a task added to the Windows Recovery Environment configuration (ResetConfig.xml) so it survives a system reset, and process protection that triggers a blue screen if the process is killed. Deleting the file is not enough – check the Recovery\OEM folder too.

Sources

  1. Cisco Talos – UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing (18 Nov 2026)
  2. Cisco Talos – IOCs for the UAT-12643 report (GitHub)
  3. Cisco Talos – The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains (18 Nov 2026)

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