Actively exploited Security news
BubbleLoader: malware loader patches WinRAR, x64dbg and Windows Media Player and hides its next stage in two PNG images
On 17 November 2026 ReversingLabs published an analysis of BubbleLoader, a loader that turns ordinary Windows programs such as WinRAR, the x64dbg debugger or Windows Media Player into carriers for other malware. The attackers overwrite a few instructions at the program's entry point and bolt on two PNG images holding encrypted code. The file still looks like the familiar tool, but it is no longer the original.
Key points
- BubbleLoader patches the entry point of a legitimate program (WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, virtiofs) and appends two PNGs: one acts as an XOR key, the other carries the encrypted next stage.
- The final payload is loaded straight into the host process's memory, and the loader changes its hash on every run, so hunting by payload hash alone will miss it.
- ReversingLabs does not name the malware BubbleLoader delivers - it says the payload varies by campaign - nor the threat actor or the delivery method.
- ReversingLabs published 24 SHA-256 hashes and detection ideas: signature checks, RWX memory, patching of RtlPcToFileHeader in ntdll and malformed PNGs.
What happened
On 17 November 2026 ReversingLabs published a write-up of a loader it calls BubbleLoader. Author Robert Simmons says the first samples appeared in February 2026 and that the company observed two distinctive activity clusters in mid-September and early October. According to ReversingLabs, the loader is being used in active campaigns.
BubbleLoader is not a standalone program. The attacker takes a legitimate executable and turns it into a carrier. ReversingLabs names five hosts abused this way: WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher and virtiofs. The payload inside varies by campaign, the company says; the report names neither specific malware families nor a threat actor.
How the attack works
The attacker writes a short piece of shellcode at the program's entry point (where Windows starts executing it) and appends two PNG images. The shellcode resolves GetModuleHandleW, GetProcAddress and VirtualAlloc through the host's import table, allocates executable memory and copies both images into it.
- The first PNG is a valid image, a red-to-blue gradient, whose data serves as a rolling XOR key.
- The second PNG has correct magic bytes but a truncated IHDR chunk: the encrypted data begins where the image width should be.
Once decrypted, the loader maps the payload (EXE or DLL) directly into the memory of the host process: it maps sections, applies relocations and imports, runs TLS callbacks and, to support exception handling, hooks RtlPcToFileHeader in ntdll. It also overwrites the payload's padding bytes with random values, so the in-memory hash changes on every run. Finally it runs the payload and exits the host process.
Who is affected
Windows users who grab common tools from unofficial sites, and organisations that don't enforce code signatures on endpoints. Developers and analysts should take particular care, since the x64dbg debugger is one of the carriers.
How to tell if you've been hit
ReversingLabs published 24 SHA-256 hashes of tampered programs (no domains or IP addresses). The full list is in the ReversingLabs analysis; the first eight:
4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14
3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710
a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a
053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917
d5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626
df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be
f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029
e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56
ReversingLabs suggests hunting for behaviour:
- a WinRAR, x64dbg or Windows Media Player executable without a valid vendor signature, or with a hash that doesn't match the original,
- memory allocated as read-write-execute (RWX) via
VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtectcalls that modifyRtlPcToFileHeaderin ntdll,- PNG files whose IHDR width field starts with byte
0x55instead of0x00.
Turn the hashes into detection rules with our IOC extractor.
What to do
- Download software only from the vendor's official site (win-rar.com, x64dbg.com, Microsoft) and check the digital signature in the file properties.
- In organisations, enforce application control (AppLocker, WDAC) based on publisher signature, not file name.
- Add the published hashes to your EDR and sweep endpoints; replace any match with the original and investigate the machine, as the final payload is unknown.
- Alert on RWX memory and the ntdll patching described above.
Timeline
- February 2026 - first BubbleLoader samples.
- Mid-September and early October 2026 - two activity clusters observed by ReversingLabs.
- 17 Nov 2026 - ReversingLabs publishes its analysis with 24 hashes.
We verified these details on 18 November 2026 against the ReversingLabs analysis. Help Net Security flagged the story to us.
FAQ
Is this a vulnerability in WinRAR or Windows Media Player?
No. These are tampered copies, not a flaw in the software. The attacker takes a genuine file, modifies it and distributes it. The original from the vendor's website with a valid vendor signature is not affected.
How do the tampered programs reach victims?
ReversingLabs does not say. Fake download pages and search ads are the usual route for trojanized installers, so download only from the vendor's official site.
Is blocking the hashes enough?
The hashes catch the known tampered carriers, not the final payload, which the loader alters on every run. Add signature enforcement and in-memory behavioural detection.
Sources
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