Actively exploited Security news

AuditTeam and OpsAgent: ransomware group demands its ransom as an "Audit & Consulting fee"

On 18 November 2026 Kaspersky's GReAT team published an analysis of AuditTeam. Since January 2026 the group has hit dozens of organisations across Asia, Europe and Africa, stealing data, encrypting files and then demanding an "audit fee" to keep the data private - as if it had run a paid penetration test. Its main tool is the OpsAgent implant, recently rewritten in Rust.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 3 minutes · For admins and analysts

Actively exploited: AuditTeam

Key points

  • AuditTeam has been active since January 2026; its leak site listed a first victim on 21 Feb 2026 and Kaspersky first saw it on 10 Mar 2026 in Hong Kong.
  • The OpsAgent implant handles files, process injection, privilege escalation, keylogging, screenshots and pivoting; C2 runs over WebSocket with TLS and its address can be stored encrypted in a public GitHub repository.
  • The cryptor uses AES-CBC or ChaCha20 with X25519, kills database and backup processes and wipes shadow copies. A separate module uses a signed driver to kill about 220 security processes.
  • The group calls its ransom an "Audit & Consulting fee" in exchange for a "vulnerability report"; Kaspersky does not say how it gets in.

What happened

Kaspersky's GReAT team described the AuditTeam group and its OpsAgent toolkit on Securelist on 18 November 2026. GitHub commit history puts the start of the campaign on 5 January 2026, the group's leak site listed its first victim on 21 February, and Kaspersky first observed it on 10 March at an organisation in Hong Kong. Activity continued until at least October 2026.

Kaspersky lists victims in China, the Philippines, Senegal, Italy, Finland, Hong Kong and Russia; the leak site also names victims in Turkey, Thailand, Ukraine, Argentina, South Korea, Japan and Spain. The report does not single out sectors - victims span different industries.

The business model is what stands out. The ransom note asks for an "Audit & Consulting fee" in return for a "vulnerability report", threatening to publish the stolen data otherwise. The group frames the intrusion as an "educational" security test.

AuditTeam attack flow according to Kaspersky1. A C, .NET or Rust loader starts OpsAgent, often by injecting into msiexec.exe; 2. OpsAgent can read an encrypted C2 address from a public GitHub repository; 3. The attackers steal data, move laterally and kill EDR with a signed driver; 4. The cryptor wipes shadow copies and encrypts files; 5. Ransom demanded as an "audit fee" under threat of a data leak1A C, .NET or Rust loader startsOpsAgent, often by injecting intomsiexec.exe2OpsAgent can read an encrypted C2address from a public GitHubrepository3The attackers steal data, movelaterally and kill EDR with a signeddriver4The cryptor wipes shadow copies andencrypts files5Ransom demanded as an "audit fee"under threat of a data leak
From loader to extortion (per Securelist)

How the attack works

  • OpsAgent (version 5.2.8) handles file management, process injection, privilege escalation, keylogging, screenshots and pivoting deeper into the network. Kaspersky compares its feature set to Cobalt Strike. It talks over WebSocket with TLS and supports SOCKS proxying and agent-to-agent forwarding.
  • OpsAgent-rs is a Rust rewrite: it starts with HTTP POST requests, can upgrade to a persistent WebSocket, adds an interactive shell and decrypts its C2 address with AES-GCM.
  • Loaders written in C and .NET inject into msiexec.exe; the Rust loader runs in-process.
  • Disabling defences: a module installs a digitally signed driver posing as Jiangmin antivirus (KV series) and kills about 220 security processes.
  • Encryption: AES-CBC or ChaCha20 with X25519 key exchange and a key per file. Before encrypting it stops database and backup software, deletes shadow copies, empties the recycle bin and overwrites deleted data.

Kaspersky does not say how the group gains initial access.

Who is affected

Windows-based organisations regardless of sector or country, including companies in the EU (Italy, Finland, Spain).

How to tell if you were hit

Indicators published by Kaspersky (defanged):

# Stagers (MD5)
d3e49dceb89a25f5da4ff0c42e996857
bd4c327ad208cb722ad25e43ea3f35fc
5d1425ab3dad1d2de053f69529d227e1
f0d5752054f6b7af1325ea340c4326d0
83768e994c6bb72d0b430b98a71ec8d6
# Abused driver (MD5, legitimate product)
109cdc24ccd4872a3e4bf6f2d4f3c3d4
# Domains, IP, GitHub-hosted C2
d19v1tntmz2i98[.]cloudfront[.]net
d35htktbyt7nxc[.]cloudfront[.]net
157.20.104[.]111
hxxps://github[.]com/RonaldCMalcolm1983/staticPage
# Paths
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\syscache.dat
C:\Users\{username}\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\syscache.dat
C:\Users\{username}\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\syscache.dat
C:\Users\Public\kv_dbg.log
C:\Windows\System32\drivers\kvcore.sys
C:\Windows\Sysnative\drivers\kvcore.sys

Also look for unusual child processes and network connections from msiexec.exe, a new driver service for kvcore.sys, mass termination of EDR processes and shadow copy deletion (vssadmin, WMI). Turn the indicators into rules with our IOC extractor and look up the relevant Windows events in the Event ID lookup.

What to do

  1. Load the indicators into your EDR, SIEM and proxy and search logs back to January 2026.
  2. Enable blocking of vulnerable and abused drivers (Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist, HVCI) and alert on new driver installations.
  3. Make sure you have offline or immutable backups and that restores actually work.
  4. If you are hit, do not pay; contact law enforcement and your national CERT.

Timeline

  • 5 Jan 2026 - campaign starts, per GitHub commit history.
  • 21 Feb 2026 - first victim listed on the leak site.
  • 10 Mar 2026 - Kaspersky observes OpsAgent in Hong Kong.
  • October 2026 - latest activity mentioned.
  • 18 Nov 2026 - Kaspersky publishes its analysis.

Facts verified on 18 Nov 2026 against Kaspersky's analysis on Securelist.

FAQ

Is paying the "audit fee" buying a legitimate service?

No. It is extortion: the attacker broke in without permission, stole data and encrypted files. Calling it an audit changes nothing. Report the incident to law enforcement and your national CERT or NCSC.

How does AuditTeam get into networks?

Kaspersky's report does not describe initial access. Defence therefore has to rely on post-compromise detection - the indicators below and monitoring of drivers and backup tooling.

What is kvcore.sys?

According to Kaspersky it is a legitimate signed driver from the Jiangmin (KV) antivirus product, abused by the attackers to kill security tools. It should not normally appear on corporate endpoints in Europe or North America.

Sources

  1. Securelist (Kaspersky GReAT) - The forced audit: how AuditTeam's OpsAgent framework masks ransomware as consulting (18 Nov 2026)

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