Actively exploited Security news

Trigram campaign: fake jobs, conferences and parcels slip developers a malicious clipboard command

The security lab at French firm Stormshield has published an analysis of Trigram, a campaign impersonating around 50 AI, blockchain and logistics companies in Europe and the US. It lures developers with a job interview, a conference invitation or a parcel-tracking link, then gets them to paste a command into a terminal that installs a stealer for passwords, wallets and keys.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 5 minutes · For admins and analysts

Actively exploited: Trigram campaign

Key points

  • Stormshield published the analysis on 11 November and updated it on 16 November. The campaign impersonates about 50 brands (including Ritual, Mina, Mantle, Linea, Webflow and Amber Group) and harvests targets from GitHub.
  • Three lures: a fake recruitment site with a referral code, an invitation to a made-up conference called ICAGLLMBT, and fake DHL, DPD and Aramex tracking portals.
  • ClickFix with a twist: the first command copied from the site is harmless; the site then reports an "error" and silently swaps the clipboard for a second command ending in a newline, so it runs the moment it's pasted.
  • The payload installs Node.js 20.18.1 and a JavaScript stealer, install_guard.js (browser credentials, crypto wallets, sensitive files). Per SafeDep, the same infrastructure also served a forged commit in the antd-img-crop GitHub repository; the npm package stayed clean.
  • Stormshield assesses with high confidence that Trigram continues the UNK_DeadDrop activity previously described by Proofpoint, and notes indicator overlaps with Kimsuky, a group attributed to North Korea.

What happened

On 11 November 2026 (updated 16 November), the Stormshield Customer Security Lab published an analysis of a campaign it calls Trigram. The attackers pose as roughly 50 companies in AI, blockchain and logistics – among them Ritual, Mina, Metis, Mantle, Linea, Initia, Fuel, Somnia, Webflow and Amber Group. None of the real companies is involved. The main targets are crypto and AI developers in Europe and the US, whose contact details the attackers harvest from GitHub, according to Stormshield. The whole operation is run from a back-office system called rms-platform.

The campaign uses three lures, hence the name:

  1. Recruitment – fake careers sites for Web3 and AI companies, with an application form and a referral code.
  2. Conference – an invitation to a made-up conference called ICAGLLMBT that victims can "forward to colleagues".
  3. Parcel – fake DHL, DPD and Aramex tracking portals.

How the attack works

How the Trigram campaign works1. The victim gets a job offer, conference invitation or parcel link and enters a referral code on the site; 2. The site asks for a "technical check" – pasting a command into PowerShell or a terminal; 3. The site reports an error and silently puts a second, self-executing command on the clipboard; 4. The script fetches portable Node.js 20.18.1 and the install_guard.js stealer, resolving its server via a GitLab repository; 5. Theft of browser credentials, wallets and sensitive files, plus an agent for persistent access1The victim gets a job offer,conference invitation or parcel linkand enters a referral code on thesite2The site asks for a "technical check"– pasting a command into PowerShellor a terminal3The site reports an error andsilently puts a second,self-executing command on theclipboard4The script fetches portable Node.js20.18.1 and the install_guard.jsstealer, resolving its server viaa GitLab repository5Theft of browser credentials, walletsand sensitive files, plus an agentfor persistent access
Attack flow per Stormshield (November 2026)

The clipboard swap (ClickFix). The first command the victim copies merely sends the code to /api/verify. The site then shows "Operation timeout. Please try again. Nonce Refreshed." and quietly replaces the clipboard contents with a second command. That one ends in a newline, so it runs as soon as it's pasted into a terminal. On Windows, PowerShell launches a hidden cmd that uses curl -ks to fetch verify_w and save it as v.cmd; on Linux and macOS it fetches verify_m and runs it detached from the terminal (setsid, or via Perl on macOS).

Second stage. The script checks for Node.js 18 or newer and otherwise downloads a portable Node.js 20.18.1. It then downloads install_guard.js and only runs it if the file is at least 50 KB. It reads its command-and-control address from a GitLab repository (pattern *-indexings/tasks). On Windows it also tries to strip the Mark-of-the-Web.

What it steals. install_guard.js collects browser credentials and data, crypto wallets, sensitive files and system information and sends them to the attackers. Stormshield says it also deploys an agent for persistent access, and that the final stage appears to be built on the OverLord framework, which it plans to cover in a follow-up.

A forged GitHub commit. The same domain behind the conference lure, icagllmbt[.]space, was also used in a supply-chain attack. SafeDep reported that on 31 October 2026 an attacker force-pushed a commit to nanxiaobei/antd-img-crop that mimics the genuine 4.30.0 release and adds scripts/prebuild.js. The script runs on npm run build and downloads verify_m or verify_w. According to SafeDep, the npm package was not affected – the risk is limited to people who built the project straight from the repository.

Who is behind it. Stormshield assesses with high confidence that Trigram is a continuation of UNK_DeadDrop, a cluster previously described by Proofpoint. It also reports overlapping indicators (an email address and an IP address) with Kimsuky, a group the industry attributes to North Korea, without giving a separate confidence level. SafeDep cautions that shared techniques alone don't prove who runs the operation.

How to tell if you're affected

A selection of indicators from Stormshield and SafeDep (the full list of about 200 entries is in the source). Domains and IPs are defanged; hashes are SHA-256:

# Droppers (SHA-256)
cd20f43f985f7df7ba3ad9b08e5bdbecc20aaa4d8f60dc09e8468bdd1b249fe6   Linux dropper
249626244f23928c75e6c382da62278ed1d4e012a0c0f62beafefc1e4d7c5baa   Windows dropper

# C2 and infrastructure
gamsterb[.]ink
api[.]cerysoi[.]ink
api[.]fallgganata[.]ink
icagllmbt[.]space
hxxps://api.gamsterb[.]ink/guard-launcher-result
hxxps://api.gamsterb[.]ink/guard-install-log

# Back-office dashboards
dokamacto[.]xyz
dashboard[.]asteara[.]org
dashboard[.]gaganata[.]ink
dashboard[.]cklomino[.]ink
almanac[.]3dscenebox[.]online

# Sample lure domains
buildwithritual[.]xyz
joinwebflow[.]xyz
mantlehires[.]xyz
waybilltrack[.]xyz
loadwatchdhl[.]xyz
inv2initia[.]ink

# IP addresses
170.205.31[.]182
170.205.30[.]27
170.205.29[.]83
170.205.28[.]251
185.147.159[.]187
146.19.215[.]187
193.160.32[.]10
193.160.32[.]188
193.160.32[.]243
65.110.40[.]18
208.84.100[.]64
23.137.104[.]77

# GitLab dead drops
gitlab[.]com/drop-indexings/tasks
gitlab[.]com/up-indexings/tasks

# Files and host artifacts
verify_w, verify_m, v.cmd, u
install_guard.js, install_guard_alt.js
~nvdg_worker.vbs              (Windows)
/var/tmp/upd_m                (Linux, macOS)
com.google.UpdateSupporter    (persistence, per SafeDep)
GoogleUpdateSupporterNode     (persistence, per SafeDep)
editor extension google-dev-tools.google-update-support

Our IOC extractor turns the list into clean input for a SIEM or firewall (including refanging [.]), and the hash calculator computes SHA-256 for suspicious files. Both run entirely in your browser.

What to look for even without specific indicators:

  • curl -k or curl -ks launched from PowerShell or a terminal shortly after a website visit, especially to newly registered .xyz, .ink, .site and .space domains,
  • a portable Node.js in a user directory that nobody installed, and connections to GitLab repositories matching *-indexings/tasks,
  • .vscode/tasks.json files in projects that run scripts from a vendor/ folder when the folder is opened, and unexpected prebuild scripts in package.json,
  • force pushes in GitHub repositories and a head commit that has lost its Verified badge.

What to do

  1. Never paste a command from a website that asks for "verification" or a "technical check". No interview, conference or courier needs that. Verify job offers on the company's official site; you can check a link with our Link checker.
  2. Search DNS, proxy, EDR and firewall logs for the indicators above.
  3. Built antd-img-crop from GitHub after 31 October 2026? Inspect package.json and scripts/prebuild.js and check the machine against the indicators.
  4. If you find traces, isolate the machine, rebuild it, and from another device rotate saved browser passwords, SSH keys, tokens and secrets from .env files; move funds from affected wallets to new ones. Report incidents to your national CERT – in the UK, the NCSC; in the US, CISA.

Timeline

Trigram campaign timeline31 Oct 2026: Forged commit in the antd-img-crop repository; first GitLab dead drop; 3 Nov 2026: SafeDep reports the forged commit; second GitLab dead drop created; 11 Nov 2026: Stormshield publishes its Trigram analysis; 16 Nov 2026: Stormshield updates the analysis31 Oct 2026Forged commit in theantd-img-crop repository;first GitLab dead drop3 Nov 2026SafeDep reports the forgedcommit; second GitLab deaddrop created11 Nov 2026Stormshield publishes itsTrigram analysis16 Nov 2026Stormshield updates theanalysis
Key dates per Stormshield and SafeDep

Updates

  • 17 Nov 2026: first version.

FAQ

How do I recognize this campaign?

The giveaway is a "technical check" or "verification" step that asks you to copy a command into PowerShell or a terminal. No genuine interview or conference needs that. If the site then reports an error and "refreshes" a code, your clipboard already holds a different command.

I use antd-img-crop. Am I affected?

According to SafeDep, the npm package was clean. The risk applies to anyone who cloned nanxiaobei/antd-img-crop from GitHub after 31 October 2026 and ran npm run build there – the forged prebuild.js script then downloaded the malicious code. Treat such a machine as compromised.

Is deleting the downloaded files enough?

No. By then the stealer may already have sent off saved browser passwords, wallet keys, SSH keys and .env files, and Stormshield says it also deploys an agent for persistent access. Rebuild or have the machine examined, and rotate every secret from a different device.

Sources

  1. Stormshield – CTI: Trigram campaign (11 Nov 2026, updated 16 Nov 2026)
  2. SafeDep – antd-img-crop forged commit delivers OverLord stealer (3 Nov 2026)
  3. Proofpoint – Don't Fear the Repo: UNK_DeadDrop phishing campaign targets developers (8 Jun 2026)

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