Actively exploited Security news

Operation ShadowCloud: GitDoor and GraphDoor backdoors hide in GitHub and Microsoft 365 traffic

On 17 November 2026 Kaspersky's GReAT team published a two-part analysis of Operation ShadowCloud, a cyberespionage campaign against government networks in Asia and Africa. The attackers run compromised machines through legitimate cloud services – GitHub, SharePoint in Microsoft 365 and the Ably messaging platform – so their traffic blends in with everyday work.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 5 minutes · For admins and analysts

Actively exploited: Operation ShadowCloud

Key points

  • Kaspersky found the campaign in early 2026. It mainly targets government organizations in Asia and Africa; apart from one case in Taiwan, no countries are named. GitHub repository creation dates suggest the infrastructure was being built from at least late 2024.
  • The initial entry point is unknown; the attackers appear to have built on an earlier compromise. Through the legitimate MeshCentral remote management agent (MeshAgent) they dropped a DLL sideloading trio: a trusted program, a malicious DLL and an encrypted config.ini.
  • GitDoor pulls commands and plug-ins from one GitHub repository and writes results to a second, private one. GraphDoor signs in to Microsoft Entra ID and reads commands from SharePoint lists through Microsoft Graph, uploading stolen data as files disguised as JavaScript source maps.
  • Both support keylogging, screenshots, browser cookie and WhatsApp key theft, Mimikatz, PetitPotam-style NTLM coercion and traffic tunnelling over Ably. Kaspersky rates its attribution as low confidence, noting overlaps with the Chinese-speaking clusters FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle.

What happened

Researchers from Kaspersky's GReAT team published a two-part analysis on 17 November 2026 of a campaign they call Operation ShadowCloud, which they uncovered in early 2026. It mainly targets government organizations in Asia and Africa; the one concrete case Kaspersky describes is two MeshCentral agents found inside a Taiwanese organization. Based on when the attackers' GitHub repositories were created, preparation started no later than late 2024.

At the heart of the campaign are two backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor. Neither relies on a conspicuous command-and-control server of its own: commands and stolen data travel through GitHub, SharePoint in Microsoft 365 and the real-time messaging service Ably. To a firewall or proxy, it looks like ordinary traffic to well-known cloud services.

How the attack works

How Operation ShadowCloud unfolds1. The attacker builds on an earlier compromise and uses a legitimate MeshCentral agent pointed at their own server; 2. Drops a trusted program, a malicious DLL and an encrypted config.ini (DLL sideloading); 3. The loader decrypts GitDoor or GraphDoor and runs it in memory; 4. Commands and plug-ins come from GitHub or SharePoint lists; results go back to a private repo or SharePoint library; 5. Credential and cookie theft, keylogging, traffic tunnelled through Ably and proxies1The attacker builds on an earliercompromise and uses a legitimateMeshCentral agent pointed at theirown server2Drops a trusted program, a maliciousDLL and an encrypted config.ini (DLLsideloading)3The loader decrypts GitDoor orGraphDoor and runs it in memory4Commands and plug-ins come fromGitHub or SharePoint lists; resultsgo back to a private repo orSharePoint library5Credential and cookie theft,keylogging, traffic tunnelled throughAbly and proxies
Attack flow according to Kaspersky (17 Nov 2026)

Getting in and settling down. Kaspersky doesn't know how the attackers first got in; the evidence points to reuse of an earlier compromise. Using MeshAgent – the legitimate MeshCentral agent, hard-coded to the attacker's server – they dropped three files: a trusted executable, a malicious DLL that the program loads instead of the real one (DLL sideloading) and an encrypted config.ini. Abused programs include OpenJDK's javaw.exe, Sandboxie's start.exe, pythonw.exe and Sysinternals zoomit.exe.

GitDoor uses two repositories: it fetches commands and plug-ins from a public one (Havo) and writes results as files and issues to a private one (Trix, accessed with a personal access token). It signals that it's alive by repeatedly adding and removing a "bug" label on an issue. Victim details are encrypted and sent to both GitHub and Ably. Kaspersky says the accounts and repositories it lists have been taken down.

GraphDoor authenticates to Microsoft Entra ID (OAuth client credentials) and uses Microsoft Graph to pull commands and plug-ins from SharePoint lists. It uploads victim data to a SharePoint library as main.<victim code>.js.map, so the file looks like a web app's source map. It has no hard-coded C2 domain – the proxy address comes from a plug-in or an Ably channel.

Capabilities across both backdoors (via plug-ins and shellcode): command execution and an interactive shell; managing files, services, scheduled tasks, the registry and users; process injection; keylogging; screenshots; browser cookie theft (CookieKatz) and WhatsApp key extraction; Mimikatz (credentials from memory and the SAM database); PetitPotam-style EFSRPC abuse to coerce NTLM authentication; uploads to upload.gofile.io; and a SOCKS5 tunnel over Ably's WebSocket service.

Attribution. Kaspersky says it lacks sufficient information for a definitive attribution. It notes overlaps with the Chinese-speaking clusters FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle – shared staging directories and their implants being deployed within a day of GitDoor – and rates its confidence as low.

How to tell if you're affected

A selection of indicators from both parts of the analysis (the full list, including every proxy server, is in the sources). Domains and IPs are defanged; hashes are MD5:

# MeshAgent and its C2
74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b
wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx

# GitDoor and GraphDoor
552f0a9cc5fc3755721fa49be05e8035   GitDoor
14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952   GraphDoor
d89b2fe0759df2d534e7a728700a6f8c   channel.ts (Go proxy)
b4956b230d296cb4b015b42b11d80e32   abchannel.ts (Go, Ably)

# Loaders and encrypted payloads (config.ini)
e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439
32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3
e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3
3896d44bc6d517291c60ee3f70543a31
b930fb3ab14fe45b378d5acfa6e0a763
6a54f8008ee659b6923abf5dba2b2cc1

# Attacker SharePoint sites
buildersemp[.]sharepoint[.]com
cskautogo[.]sharepoint[.]com

# Cobalt Strike domains
twnic[.]top
ekmt[.]tw

# Proxy servers (selection)
104.194.154[.]28
216.73.158[.]72
122.147.252[.]16
103.106.230[.]33
123.58.205[.]105

# GitHub accounts (taken down, per Kaspersky)
LatonyCharnleyaW (repos Havo, Trix)
StevenDFournier, JeneLeo, VenoraKlanimU, AlexandaJazzmynwC
FloraineSuvitC, bvgarciajocelynxccZ, Eclemensadolph1n, aYulysseserinYtas

# Host artifacts
C:\Windows\System32\start.exe + sbiedll.dll + config.ini
C:\Windows\System32\dts\pc\apo4x\dtsapo4service.exe + python39.dll + config.ini
C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log\<GUID>
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat   (keylogger output)
%APPDATA%\log.lock
\\.\pipe\MyInputPipe
\\.\pipe\p<PID>
Local\sm<PID>, Local\pc<PID>, Local\pcs<PID>
Global\ExitEvent
uploaded file: main.<victim code>.js.map

Our IOC extractor turns the list into clean input for a SIEM or firewall (including refanging [.]), and the hash calculator computes MD5 for suspicious files. Both run entirely in your browser.

What to look for even without specific indicators:

  • a MeshCentral agent you didn't deploy, or agent.ashx connections to an unknown server,
  • signed programs (javaw.exe, pythonw.exe, zoomit.exe, start.exe) running from unusual folders and loading a DLL sitting next to them,
  • connections to api.github.com, graph.microsoft.com, rest.ably.io or main.pusher.ably.net from processes that don't normally use them,
  • client-credentials sign-ins by an unfamiliar app in Entra ID audit logs, and *.js.map uploads in SharePoint.

What to do

  1. Search DNS, proxy, EDR and firewall logs for the indicators above.
  2. Inventory remote management tools (MeshCentral, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect…) and allow only approved ones – ideally through application allowlisting.
  3. Review Entra ID app registrations and their Microsoft Graph permissions (especially Sites.* and Files.*); remove unknown apps holding client secrets.
  4. Restrict direct outbound internet access for servers and office workstations through a proxy with rules by process or group, not just by domain.
  5. If you find traces, treat the passwords of every account that signed in to affected machines as compromised (Mimikatz, NTLM), reset them and report the incident to your national CERT – in the UK the NCSC, in the US CISA.

Timeline

Operation ShadowCloud timelinelate 2024: GitHub repository creation dates point to infrastructure preparation; early 2026: Kaspersky uncovers the campaign; 5 Mar 2026: GitDoor staged in a campaign linked to FamousSparrow; 4 May 2026: GitDoor staged a day after CopperTurtle tooling; 17 Nov 2026: Kaspersky publishes its analysis and indicatorslate 2024GitHub repository creationdates point to infrastructurepreparationearly 2026Kaspersky uncovers thecampaign5 Mar 2026GitDoor staged in a campaignlinked to FamousSparrow4 May 2026GitDoor staged a day afterCopperTurtle tooling17 Nov 2026Kaspersky publishes itsanalysis and indicators
Key dates according to Kaspersky

Updates

  • 17 Nov 2026: first version.

FAQ

Should I block GitHub or SharePoint?

Not wholesale – legitimate work depends on them. What matters is which process connects. A browser or Git on a developer's machine is fine; javaw.exe, pythonw.exe or zoomit.exe calling api.github.com or graph.microsoft.com from an office workstation is not.

Which vulnerability should I patch?

Kaspersky names none. It only infers the entry point: the attackers appear to have reused an earlier compromise and then relied on the legitimate MeshCentral tool. That makes it worth auditing which remote management tools run on your network and who installed them.

Is China behind this?

Kaspersky says outright that it lacks sufficient information to attribute the activity definitively. It points to overlaps with the Chinese-speaking clusters FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle and rates its confidence as low. We don't attribute it to any state either.

Sources

  1. Kaspersky Securelist – Operation ShadowCloud, Part 1: GitDoor (17 Nov 2026)
  2. Kaspersky Securelist – Operation ShadowCloud, Part 2: GraphDoor (17 Nov 2026)

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