Actively exploited Security news
Retadup, the worm police shut down in 2019, is delivering CoffeeLoader through its re-registered C2 domains
On 16 November 2026 Kaspersky reported that Retadup, an old worm that spreads via USB drives, is active again. French police took over its botnet in 2019 and told 850,000 machines to clean themselves up. But surviving copies lived on, and someone re-registered the original command-and-control domains. They are now using them to push the CoffeeLoader downloader. Here is how it works, the indicators, and what to check.
Key points
- On 16 November 2026 Kaspersky (Securelist) published an analysis showing the Retadup worm, first seen in 2017, spreading again and pulling down the CoffeeLoader downloader.
- In July 2019 France's National Gendarmerie (C3N), working from Avast's research, took over Retadup's C2 server and told more than 850,000 infected machines to remove the worm.
- About two years ago someone re-registered the original C2 domains. Machines where Retadup survived now call home again and receive third-party malware: first SmokeLoader, and CoffeeLoader since early 2025.
- In the first three quarters of 2026 Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia.
- The report lists domains, MD5 hashes, file paths and registry values you can hunt for.
What happened
On 16 November 2026 Kaspersky researcher Oleg Kupreev published an analysis on Securelist showing that the Retadup worm is spreading again, this time as a delivery channel for the CoffeeLoader downloader.
Retadup is a worm written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey, first seen in 2017. It copies itself to USB and external drives and ties infected machines into a botnet that downloads and runs further malware. In 2019, according to Avast, it mostly pushed a Monero cryptominer and in some cases the Stop ransomware and the Arkei password stealer.
In July 2019 the French National Gendarmerie's cybercrime centre (C3N), acting on Avast's research, took over the botnet's C2 server and replaced it with a disinfection server. Infected machines that connected to it were told to remove the worm. On 28 August 2019 Avast reported more than 850,000 unique infections neutralized, mostly in Spanish-speaking Latin America.
The problem is what was left behind. Machines that never connected, and drives carrying copies of the worm, stayed infected. According to Kaspersky, about two years ago someone re-registered Retadup's original C2 domains and started feeding third-party malware to those leftover infections: SmokeLoader at first, then CoffeeLoader from early 2025. Kaspersky does not know whether the original author is behind it.
How the attack works
- Retadup talks to its C2 using plaintext commands encoded with Base64 and then hex. Kaspersky quotes a command seen in 2026 traffic telling the bot to download
update.exefromrurjfvn[.]rs. - The installer (NSIS) drops a patched 7-Zip library,
7z.dll, and runs it throughrundll32.exe. The code is wrapped in the Armoury packer; the new variant decrypts its payload on the GPU via OpenGL (previously OpenCL), which hampers analysis in sandboxes without a GPU. - Persistence comes from a
Runkey plus a matchingStartupApproved\Runentry, so the user cannot disable the autostart entry from Task Manager. - CoffeeLoader injects into one of
dllhost.exe,WerFault.exe,svchost.exe,OpenWith.exeorAtBroker.exe, downloads its main body over HTTPS, verifies it with a signature and an MD5 check, and runs it by injection, as an EXE or as a DLL. Kaspersky says the only change from the earlier version is the protocol magic value (from0xC0FFEE42to0xD1D57871); functionality is unchanged.
In the first three quarters of 2026 Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia.
How to tell if you were compromised
Indicators from Kaspersky's report (defanged). The report lists no IP addresses or detection names.
Retadup C2 servers:
alphanoob[.]com
newblackage[.]com
newminersage[.]com
radnewage[.]com
minernewage[.]com
rad2016.publicvm[.]com
radpal.publicvm[.]com
roro2016.linkpc[.]net
CoffeeLoader C2:
internet-speed-check[.]com
Download locations:
rurjfvn[.]rs/update.exe
alphanoob[.]com/update.exe
CoffeeLoader MD5 (DLL):
2272dde17925d6179bea6fcf4d543d20
dce55eec553f6af16ba6481eaacb8638
449c9e8bc6eb308aa3c46c88959e1a4f
NSIS installer MD5:
58886d45a0c5e802a5d0a7545c36112d
cca710c5455c1fe2732771afbac16a09
Paths:
C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\b79faace\b79faace.dll
Registry:
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
b79faace.dll = rundll32.exe "C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll",SetCodecs
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run
b79faace.dll
Request path: /payload?md5=
Also watch for:
rundll32.exeloading a DLL fromProgramDataorAppData\Localwith theSetCodecsexport,- AutoIt or AutoHotkey interpreters running from hidden folders or removable drives,
- LNK shortcuts in the root of a USB drive named like an existing folder with a short suffix while the real folders are hidden (Avast's 2019 description),
- DNS lookups for the domains above in proxy and DNS logs, including from long-neglected machines.
You can paste proxy or DNS logs into our IOC extractor and check a suspicious file against the hashes with our hash calculator. Both run entirely in your browser.
What to do
Kaspersky's report does not include specific recommendations. Based on the behavior it describes:
- Block the domains from the indicator list on DNS and proxies and search your logs retroactively.
- Hunt across endpoints for the
b79faacepaths and theRunkey values (EDR, inventory tooling or a script). - Disable AutoPlay for removable media via Group Policy and, where operations allow, restrict USB storage to approved devices.
- Teach users not to open a shortcut on a USB drive that looks like a folder. Showing file extensions and hidden files makes the trick easier to spot.
- Don't forget old machines and drives. Retadup survived precisely on forgotten computers and media. Clean or reimage an infected machine and check every drive that has been plugged into it.
Timeline
- 2017 – Retadup first seen.
- March 2019 – Avast starts tracking Retadup and contacts the French Gendarmerie.
- July 2019 – C3N takes over the C2 server and starts disinfection; on 28 August 2019 Avast reports more than 850,000 infections neutralized.
- around 2024 – someone re-registers the original C2 domains and pushes SmokeLoader.
- early 2025 – CoffeeLoader starts spreading through Retadup.
- Q1–Q3 2026 – Kaspersky blocks infection attempts on about 15,000 systems.
- 16 Nov 2026 – Kaspersky publishes its analysis with indicators.
Verified against sources on 16 November 2026.
FAQ
How does Retadup get onto a machine?
According to Avast's 2019 analysis, the worm spreads mainly through removable and other non-C: drives. It drops LNK shortcuts in the drive root named after existing folders and hides the real ones. Clicking such a shortcut runs the worm. Kaspersky's new report does not detail how the current wave spreads.
Why didn't the 2019 cleanup get rid of it?
The 2019 disinfection worked only for machines that connected to the police-controlled server and received the uninstall command. Machines that never connected, and USB drives sitting in drawers, kept the infection. Once someone re-registered the original domains, those surviving copies started reporting to them.
What is CoffeeLoader?
A downloader: its job is to fetch and run more malware. Kaspersky says it hides inside ordinary Windows processes such as dllhost.exe or svchost.exe, sets itself to run at startup and downloads its next stage over HTTPS. What it ultimately delivers depends on whoever controls it.
Are the indicators enough?
They are a good start, but domains and hashes change. Also look for behavior: rundll32.exe loading a DLL from ProgramData or AppData\Local with the SetCodecs export, AutoIt or AutoHotkey running from hidden folders, and folder-like shortcuts in the root of USB drives.
Sources
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