Actively exploited Security news
PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT: espionage RATs use HTTP/3 over QUIC to slip past network inspection
On 16 November 2026 Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 described a cyberespionage campaign against government bodies in Southeast Asia. The cluster it tracks as TGR-STA-0049 uses two new remote access trojans, PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT, that talk to their servers over HTTP/3 – QUIC on UDP port 443 – which many firewalls and TLS inspection setups don't look into.
Key points
- Unit 42 attributes the campaign to TGR-STA-0049, which overlaps with clusters others call REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon. Targets are government bodies in Southeast Asia; decoys mention an election in Myanmar and the stolen files concern foreign relations and internal politics.
- The attackers get in mainly through unpatched Microsoft Exchange and web servers, where they plant web shells (ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Suo5 and others), and also through phishing with fake PDFs. Unit 42 names no CVE.
- PerfectPioneer (Go, six variants) and KUKURAT (C++, at least 12 modules) use HTTP/3 over QUIC for C2 and fall back to HTTP/2. Both can log keystrokes, take screenshots, inject into processes and tunnel traffic; KUKURAT also spreads with PsExec and brute-forces SMB credentials.
- Unit 42 published dozens of SHA-256 hashes, nine C2 domains and two IP addresses. It doesn't attribute the activity to a particular state.
What happened
On 16 November 2026 Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 published an analysis of a cyberespionage campaign it has watched since at least July 2025. The cluster behind it, TGR-STA-0049, overlaps according to Unit 42 with groups other researchers call REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon, and has been active since at least March 2023. It previously used the Squidoor (FINALDRAFT) backdoor.
The targets are government bodies in Southeast Asia. Decoy documents refer to an election in Myanmar and the attackers mostly took PDF, Word, Excel and PNG files about foreign relations and internal politics. Earlier activity by the cluster also hit governments in South America and Europe.
What's new are two remote access trojans that use HTTP/3 – the newest HTTP version, carried over QUIC on UDP rather than TCP. Many networks only inspect TCP traffic, so QUIC can pass without a closer look.
How the attack works
Initial access. Mostly web shells (ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Suo5 and custom variants) on unpatched Microsoft Exchange and web servers; less often phishing with executables that have a PDF icon, and lookalike government domains. One decoy installer bundled a genuine GlobalProtect installer as cover. Unit 42 names no CVE.
PerfectPioneer is written in Go and comes in six variants. It talks to /agent/register, /agent/heartbeat, /agent/tasks and /agent/result over HTTP/3 and falls back to HTTP/2. It can manage files and processes, run commands, inject code into other processes, log keystrokes, take screenshots and act as a SOCKS5 proxy. It persists through the Run key in HKCU and a shortcut in the Startup folder.
KUKURAT is a modular C++ framework with at least 12 modules loaded from C2, in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 variants. Besides spying, it scans ports and hosts, moves laterally with its own PsExec service, brute-forces SMB credentials, elevates privileges and runs BOFs. To hide, it generates harmless-looking "noise" in network traffic, the registry and files. A watchdog relaunches it if it stops responding.
After the break-in the attackers use Mimikatz, ProcDump and SharpDPAPI, dump LSASS through comsvcs.dll called by ordinal, run DCSync, and in Exchange check who holds the ApplicationImpersonation role before granting themselves FullAccess to all mailboxes with Add-MailboxPermission.
How to tell if you've been hit
A selection of indicators from Unit 42 (the full list of hashes, including web shells, is in the source). Domains and IPs are defanged:
# C2 domains – PerfectPioneer
www.maui-cocktailbar[.]com
ads-edge[.]com
www.wkuyda[.]com
www.thailisting[.]net
www.yangon.it[.]com
# C2 domains – KUKURAT
www.cloudflacecdn[.]com
www.police.gr[.]com
www.investigationj6[.]com
# Other domain
www.sacofficegov[.]com
# IP addresses
27.254.164[.]212
27.254.164[.]209
# SHA-256 – KUKURAT (HTTP/3 and HTTP/2), watchdog, PsExecService
b8dca1c7e7a74ce82ab4e4cad9b718a458735d2c6c956e4cf3109aac59bfd0e4
9fb0976fcd1f92c4711726a91cff8be9a39944efedc4caf2d80f935327f8f490
7225ef57161cf0908560811be798d22e9354c071d576540a43aa7900784c0688
a214d264c6bb0d2ba89986f73e196ea200307574745a245fc42c32fbef4cc140
662dc73e11b60b2f12c94b6b68da45de7bffece4b1dcc75679ed020629d0705d
b062b4d8c19baf5c1568e28b3e0a5e2318e9501ea61ddfe804d9755c1bdbf887
34cc9bc4a533b91e7cdb30fecc57ba609dc890780fd13ecfbc253047b3b37b78
# SHA-256 – PerfectPioneer (selection)
2281e754f70e11298db1a0a7c1b527cf2b5eec2056d4c73a46ed572ab873dc6e
f4c9d5d13c1a09533876a02f6fa04831efbf600b05cfb3ed765a0ebde82b0457
92fb9545ea49e2fb4635fce1859ff3f609738be75f85d146614243fc8bc80b67
ab06f540ecdd1d45491aa71bfc04c80852371c8f5cd43b9a6ebb53f1e1b69588
bf59f8d7ef79b09a72bbb9c05ca8746466d03226a3779cc1096ba067117ca008
61f7e2f4159c566578e88cb05cdf49e4378f45ebddbd332224e97c11df922120
8cfe629fc08ae06c8ba106113ba30bb16fa2fbbf8bd3dd6831d16b031e0ebe70
# Host artefacts
named pipe: \\.\pipe\PSEXEC
named pipe: WINDOW_SEC_WATCHDOG
service: PsExec
file: \Windows\Temp\MxA.tar
local listener on TCP 56793 (rat_http3_cc variant)
rundll32.exe loading comsvcs.dll with #+000024
Our IOC extractor turns the list into clean input for a SIEM or firewall, and the hash calculator checks file hashes. Both run entirely in your browser.
What to do
- Log or block outbound UDP 443 where you don't need QUIC (servers, admin networks). The malware then falls back to TCP, which your proxy and TLS inspection can see.
- Search DNS, proxy and EDR logs for the domains, IPs and hashes above.
- Check Exchange: who holds the ApplicationImpersonation role, whether the logs show a loop of
Add-MailboxPermissiongranting FullAccess, and whether there are unknown.aspxfiles in IIS directories. Patch Exchange and web servers. - Audit SYSVOL and Group Policy for changed logon scripts and alert on suspicious processes started at user logon.
- Detect LSASS dumping via
rundll32.exeandcomsvcs.dll. If you find traces, treat the passwords of every account that logged on to the machine – and, after DCSync, of the whole domain – as compromised, and report the incident to your national CERT.
Timeline
Updates
- 17 Nov 2026: first version.
FAQ
Should I just block QUIC?
Unit 42 recommends logging or blocking outbound UDP 443. Browsers then fall back to HTTP/2 or HTTP/1.1 over TCP, which your proxy and TLS inspection can see. On servers and in government networks, outbound QUIC is rarely needed. On user networks, try it on a test group first – a few services may load more slowly.
Which vulnerability should I patch?
Unit 42 doesn't name one. It only says the attackers used unpatched Exchange and web servers. In practice: keep Exchange on a supported build with the latest security update, don't expose OWA and ECP more than necessary and look for unknown .aspx files in web directories.
Is this a state-sponsored group?
Unit 42 describes an espionage campaign against governments but doesn't attribute it to any particular state, so we don't either.
Sources
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