Actively exploited Security news
Attacker abuses customers' trust in Qubole to assume their AWS roles and steal secrets and S3 data
Wiz reported on 9 November 2026 that an attacker holding IAM credentials from an AWS account tied to the Qubole data platform assumed integration roles that customers had created for it, often years ago. Inside those accounts the attacker read secrets from Lambda, Secrets Manager and Parameter Store and downloaded whole S3 buckets. Here are the indicators and the CloudTrail checks to run.
Key points
- Using IAM credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole, the attacker called sts:AssumeRole into customers' integration roles; every request carried an External ID and every one succeeded.
- Inside victim accounts it read Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store and Lambda environment variables, validated what it found with TruffleHog and pulled data from S3, sometimes entire buckets.
- Most of the abused roles were otherwise unused: forgotten integrations whose trust was never removed. Wiz calls the actor opportunistic and has not attributed it.
What happened
Researchers at Wiz published an analysis on 9 November 2026 of a campaign first flagged by Sentra and investigated together with Mandiant. The attacker obtained credentials for an IAM user in an AWS account associated with the Qubole data platform (account 805246085872). Qubole works inside customers' accounts through cross-account roles: the customer creates a role that trusts the vendor's account instead of handing over long-lived keys. That trust is what the attacker exploited.
The activity ran from 14 to 26 October 2026 and, according to Wiz, hit "multiple" customer environments. Wiz has not said how many organisations were affected.
How the attack worked
- The attacker called
sts:AssumeRoleinto customers' integration roles. Every request carried the right External ID, and all succeeded. Session names started withquiam-(for examplequiam-enum). - It enumerated S3 buckets, EC2 instances, RDS databases, IAM roles and KMS keys.
- It read secrets via
GetSecretValue,GetParameterandGetFunctionConfiguration(Lambda environment variables). - It validated the AWS keys, Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials it found with TruffleHog.
- It downloaded S3 objects with
GetObject, in some sessions entire buckets.
Wiz also found a Windows-focused file, sso_agent.iso, on the attacker's server that collects system information and polls for commands, but saw no deployments on victims. A separate burst of activity on 8-11 October, testing keys customers had created for Qubole integrations, could not be definitively linked to the main campaign. In an 11 November update, Wiz notes that Risky Business reported an actor calling itself "n0n" claiming responsibility; Wiz has not confirmed this.
How to tell if you were hit
Review CloudTrail from 1 October 2026 in every account with an integration role:
AssumeRolewhereuserIdentity.accountId=805246085872andsourceIPAddressis not an AWS address (legitimate Qubole traffic came from AWS infrastructure),- any activity by
userIdentity.principalId=AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS(seen only in attacker activity, per Wiz), AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HWfrom non-AWS addresses (used by the attacker from 18 Oct, also by the platform),GetCallerIdentitywith a TruffleHog user agent from the addresses below, plus the same user agent in Entra ID and Okta sign-in logs.
Indicators from the Wiz report (defanged; replace [.] with a dot):
57.129.54[.]120 OVH, primary address (15-26 Oct 2026)
2001:41d0:70d[:]7800:: OVH, credential checks (16-24 Oct)
45.83.220[.]211 Mullvad VPN (14-15 Oct)
185.209.199[.]73 Mullvad VPN (18-21 Oct)
89.37.63[.]175 Mullvad VPN (25 Oct)
AWS account: 805246085872 (also legitimate Qubole traffic)
Sessions: quiam-*
sso_agent.iso SHA-256 65f061281c9a712e9502793dc4c5035cae490b84da05f7d4223cefa65ad396e4
SHA-1 1c7437dac21630f53c0b888b50662c6487e23fd7
MD5 086d4a83181971e883c53a4c44f46da2
Mullvad exits are shared by many VPN users, so a hit from them alone proves nothing. Our IOC extractor pulls indicators out of the full report. For every session you find, review everything it did next, especially in Secrets Manager, SSM, Lambda and S3.
What to do
- Inventory trust: list every role whose trust policy allows an external account. Delete unused integrations or remove the vendor account from them.
- If you find activity: revoke the role's active sessions and rotate every secret, parameter and Lambda environment variable it could read. Rotation alone does not end issued sessions.
- Narrow it down: replace the vendor's
:rootprincipal with specific principals and addaws:SourceIporaws:SourceVpceconditions matching the vendor's networks. - Don't treat the External ID as a secret: rotate it with the vendor and use a distinct value per role.
- Limit integration roles to least privilege, run an organisation trail across all accounts and regions, and enable S3 data events for sensitive buckets.
- Alert when a vendor role is assumed from a new network or a hosting provider.
Timeline
- 8-11 Oct 2026 - customer keys for Qubole integrations tested (link uncertain).
- 14 Oct 2026 - first role assumption, from a Mullvad VPN address.
- 18 Oct 2026 - attacker switches to a second IAM user.
- 26 Oct 2026 - last observed activity.
- 9 Nov 2026 - Wiz publishes its analysis.
- 11 Nov 2026 - Wiz update ("n0n" claim reported by Risky Business, unconfirmed).
Details come from Wiz's report of 9 November 2026, including its 11 November update (checked 16 Nov 2026). AWS's statement is as reported by The Register, which says Qubole did not respond. A similar pattern, a forgotten vendor credential, features in our report on the Barracuda breach led by ARTEX.
FAQ
Was AWS itself breached?
No. According to The Register, AWS said its services were not compromised; the activity involved misuse of third-party credentials to reach roles customers had configured to trust that provider.
We stopped using Qubole years ago. Should we care?
Quite possibly, yes. Wiz found that most of the assumed roles were otherwise idle but their trust policies were still in place. Check whether any role still trusts account 805246085872.
Is rotating the secrets enough?
No. Rotating a credential does not end sessions that were already issued. Revoke the role's active sessions first, then rotate everything it could read.
Doesn't the External ID protect us?
Not as a secret. It is logged in plain text in CloudTrail, and here the attacker supplied it on every request. It prevents confused-deputy mix-ups between customers, not abuse of the vendor's own account.
Sources
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