Actively exploited Security news
Optimizely supply-chain attack: card skimmer and crypto clipper ran on the websites of Zoom, the BBC, CNN and 175 other organisations
On 16 November 2026 an attacker wrote malicious JavaScript into Optimizely Web customer projects, so the experimentation snippet that big brands load from Optimizely's CDN pulled in a crypto address swapper, a payment card skimmer and iPhone exploit kits. Researcher Scott Helme of Report URI found 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA and HSBC. Most were cleaned the same evening.
Key points
- The attacker edited the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web projects; the CDN then served the poisoned snippet to every visitor. Optimizely's own site was among the victims.
- The payload swapped crypto wallet addresses, stole card details typed into forms, sent cookies and screenshots to the attacker and loaded Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits on older iPhones.
- First injection seen at 04:21 UTC on 16 Nov; by 21:52 UTC only one of 188 snippets was still infected. About USD 7,000 reached the attacker's wallets.
- Optimizely confirmed the incident on its status page (17 Nov, 01:02 UTC): an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation, which is now fixed, and the injected code has been removed. A spokesperson told Cointelegraph the flaw was in the account signup flow.
What happened
Optimizely Web is an A/B testing and personalisation service. Customers put one script tag on their pages, for example cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js, and the snippet carries whatever the customer configured in the Optimizely console - including a free-form Project JavaScript field that runs on every page view.
On 16 November 2026 an attacker wrote a one-line loader into that field across many customer projects. Report URI checked 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations: banks, airlines, retailers, streaming services, news sites and Optimizely's own website. Report URI stresses that the CDN was not cache-poisoned - it "served exactly what it was given". Companies that serve the snippet from their own domain were hit too, because the content still comes from the Optimizely project.
Technical details
The loader pulled track.js from 1688360[.]cc, either as a plain script tag, as a base64 string decoded with atob(), or as a full inline copy run through eval in case the domain was blocked. The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day. According to Report URI it:
- swapped crypto addresses (BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, LTC, BCH, DOGE) in page text, forms, links and the clipboard;
- from 13:43 UTC skimmed card data (number, expiry, CVV) from forms and POST requests and sent it to
/card.php; - sent the page URL, non-
HttpOnlycookies and an html2canvas screenshot to/hit.phpwhen it swapped an address near payment wording; - on iPhones and iPads loaded
boot.jsfrom.icudomains and, in a hidden iframe, the Coruna (iOS 13-17) or DarkSword (iOS 18.x) exploit kits. Comments in the kit say iOS 18.7.3 and 26.3 and later are patched.
About USD 7,000 reached the attacker's wallets on 16 November. How many cards and cookies were stolen cannot be seen from outside.
How the attacker got in: Report URI and StepSecurity could not determine it. An Optimizely spokesperson told Cointelegraph that an unauthorised party exploited a flaw in the Experimentation account signup flow, and that the company has blocked the vulnerable path, removed the injected code, ended sessions, revoked tokens, reset affected accounts and notified affected customers. On 17 Nov, Optimizely's status page confirmed the exploited Experimentation vulnerability, the fix and the code removal (without mentioning the signup flow).
StepSecurity adds that not every site was hit through its own Optimizely project: according to a write-up it cites, Fox News got the payload via an ad script and American Eagle via its own bundle.
Who is affected
- Organisations using Optimizely Web, especially the 178 identified by Report URI (Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock and others).
- Visitors to those sites on 16 November 2026 who typed card details into a site's own form, copied or pasted a crypto address, or browsed on iOS older than 18.7.3.
Of 256 hosts Report URI tested, only 24 (15%) blocked the payload with their Content Security Policy. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com did not help; policies with 'strict-dynamic' or 'unsafe-eval' let the payload through.
How to tell if you were compromised
Indicators from Report URI and StepSecurity (defanged):
Domains: 1688360[.]cc (track.js, card.php, hit.php, html2canvas.min.js)
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu
1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu
je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu
ios-hack[.]icu webshell[.]lol linkforge[.]cc
IPs: 136.113.106[.]136 34.96.213[.]201 34.87.36[.]58
SHA-256 (track.js):
617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3
814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40
Markers: window._k7 window.__k7b data-channel-code="02111110"
Wallets: BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
ETH/BSC 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
TRX THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
Search DNS, proxy and CSP report logs from 08:00 UTC on 16 November. A clean snippet today does not prove it was clean that day - check Optimizely's change history for Project JavaScript. Turn the list into detections with our IOC extractor.
What to do
- Optimizely customers: open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code; look for
1688360,.icu,track.js,atob(and code you did not write. - Review users, API tokens and integrations with write access, and rotate credentials.
- Treat card details entered into your own forms on 16 November, and secrets in non-
HttpOnlycookies, as exposed. Decide whether to notify customers. - Block the domains above and tighten CSP: an explicit
script-srcandconnect-srcallowlist, no'unsafe-eval', reporting on. Keep third-party tags off checkout pages and use hosted payment fields. - Visitors: update iPhone and iPad (iOS 18.7.3+ or 26.3+), check card statements and verify crypto addresses on the wallet's own screen.
Timeline
- 9 Nov 2026 - first iOS exploit-kit domains registered.
- 16 Nov, 04:21 UTC - first Optimizely injection seen (BBC snippet);
1688360[.]ccregistered at 05:23. - 16 Nov, 13:43 UTC - card skimmer added; iOS stage expanded in the afternoon.
- 16 Nov, 20:40-21:10 UTC - mass clean-up; at 21:52 one snippet still infected.
- 16-17 Nov - Report URI and StepSecurity publish; Optimizely comments to Cointelegraph.
- 16 Nov, 23:11 UTC - Report URI sees every infected Optimizely file clean.
- 17 Nov, 00:37 UTC - main payload domain
1688360[.]ccplaced on clientHold. - 17 Nov, 01:02 UTC - Optimizely posts the incident on its status page (status: monitoring).
- 17 Nov, 04:11-05:39 UTC - attacker empties the wallets.
We verified these details on 17 Nov 2026 (updated 18 Nov) against the Report URI and StepSecurity analyses and Optimizely's status page. The detail about the signup flow is quoted as reported by Cointelegraph.
Update
- 18 Nov 2026: Report URI updated its analysis on 17 Nov. Every infected Optimizely file has been clean since 23:11 UTC on 16 Nov. The main payload and data-collection server
1688360[.]ccwas put on clientHold at 00:37 UTC on 17 Nov and no longer resolves;webshell[.]lolfollowed at 03:37 UTC, and two of the.icuexploit domains are down or unresponsive. Revised on-chain receipts total roughly USD 7,150 (about USD 5,490 of it in bitcoin), and the attacker moved the funds out between 04:11 and 05:39 UTC on 17 Nov. According to KrebsOnSecurity, Optimizely also said it has added protections against malicious code being delivered through Cloudflare and is running a full investigation with outside experts. How the attacker got in is still not public. The status page still shows the incident as monitoring. The indicators above stay relevant for log searches covering 16 Nov. - 17 Nov 2026, morning: Optimizely officially confirmed the incident on status.optimizely.com - the Experimentation vulnerability is fixed, the injected code removed, affected user accounts secured and protections added against unauthorised code delivery; the incident is in monitoring. According to BleepingComputer, Salesforce disabled Optimizely scripts across its instances as a precaution, and Optimizely will post further updates on the status page.
- 17 Nov 2026: first version.
FAQ
I visited Zoom, the BBC or CNN on 16 November. Am I affected?
Only if your browser loaded the poisoned snippet and you did something the code targets: typed card details into a form on the site, copied a crypto address, or used an iPhone or iPad on iOS older than 18.7.3. Update iOS, check your card statement and double-check any crypto transfer made that day.
Would Subresource Integrity (SRI) have stopped this?
Not in practice. Optimizely snippets change whenever a project changes, so they are rarely pinned with an integrity hash. What helped, according to Report URI, was a strict script-src and connect-src policy that blocked the attacker's domain.
Is the card skimmer able to read payment iframes?
Report URI says card fields inside a payment provider's hosted, cross-origin iframe were out of reach. Card details typed directly into a site's own form were not.
Sources
- Report URI (Scott Helme) - World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely (16 Nov 2026)
- StepSecurity - OPTIMJACK: Optimizely-hosted scripts served a crypto clipper and card skimmer (17 Nov 2026)
- Optimizely Status - Web Experimentation Security Incident (17 Nov 2026)
- Cointelegraph - Optimizely spokesperson statement (17 Nov 2026)
- BleepingComputer - Optimizely supply chain attack infects major brands' sites with malware (16 Nov 2026)
- KrebsOnSecurity - Attackers Used Optimizely to A/B Test Malware on Top Websites (17 Nov 2026)
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