Patch available Security news

Drupal fixes a critical installer flaw: install.php can be abused to take over a site

On 18 November 2026 the Drupal Security Team released a fix for SA-CORE-2026-017 (CVE-2026-132165), a critical flaw in the installer. Under specific conditions an unauthenticated attacker can use install.php to attempt a reinstall of Drupal, leading to site takeover or code execution on the server. The advisory says a proof of concept exists. Fixed releases are 11.4.13, 11.3.22 and 10.6.22; if you can't upgrade right away, block the installer at the web server.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 4 minutes · For admins and analysts

Patch available: Drupal SA-CORE-2026-017

Key points

  • Affected: Drupal core before 10.6.22, 11.0.0–11.3.21 and 11.4.0–11.4.12. Branches 11.2.x, 10.5.x and older will not be fixed.
  • The bug: under specific conditions install.php can be used to start a fresh Drupal install and take over the site, or run code. No login is required.
  • Drupal's rating: critical (18/25); complex to exploit and limited to uncommon configurations, but a PoC exists.
  • A second fix shipped the same day: SA-CORE-2026-018 (CVE-2026-132166), a gadget chain that is only exploitable together with a separate deserialization bug.

What happened

On 18 November 2026 the Drupal Security Team shipped fixes for every supported core branch, flagged two days earlier in PSA-2026-11-16. The headline fix, SA-CORE-2026-017, addresses CVE-2026-132165 in the install.php installer. Drupal rates it critical (18 out of 25) on its own risk scale.

According to the advisory, under specific conditions an attacker can use the installer to attempt a fresh install of Drupal. That can end in site takeover or remote code execution, and no authentication is needed. The rating also states that a working proof of concept exists. Nobody has confirmed exploitation in the wild yet (as of 19 Nov 2026).

The advisory credits Anthropic's OSS Scanner with finding the bug. Sites behind Drupal Steward, the community's paid WAF-level protection service, are already covered against the known attack vectors, though Drupal still tells them to upgrade soon.

Technical details

  • Component: the Drupal core installer, core/install.php. It exists for the first install and has no job on a finished site.
  • Flaw type: under certain conditions the installer lets someone rerun installation over an existing site. Whoever drives the install chooses the database and the first administrator, which amounts to owning the site.
  • Conditions: the risk vector marks exploitation as complex (AC:Complex) and limited to uncommon configurations (TD:Uncommon). Drupal has not published the exact preconditions. It only says that some attack paths are blocked when the web server cannot write to settings.php or change its permissions.
  • Impact: all non-public data readable, and all data can be modified or deleted (CI:All, II:All).

The second fix released the same day, SA-CORE-2026-018 (CVE-2026-132166, moderately critical 14/25), removes a gadget chain from core. It is not exploitable on its own: an attacker would also need a separate bug that feeds untrusted data into unserialize(). The same releases fix it.

How an attack via SA-CORE-2026-017 would work1. Attacker finds a site with /core/install.php reachable; 2. Under specific conditions they start a fresh install over the live site; 3. The install rewrites settings and creates a new administrator; 4. Attacker controls the site and can run code on the server1Attacker finds a site with/core/install.php reachable2Under specific conditions they starta fresh install over the live site3The install rewrites settings andcreates a new administrator4Attacker controls the site and canrun code on the server
Based on Drupal's advisory (18 Nov 2026); exact conditions are not public

Who is affected

columns: Branch | Versions | Status
row: Drupal 11.4.x | 11.4.0–11.4.12 | vulnerable
row: Drupal 11.4.x | 11.4.13 | fixed
row: Drupal 11.3.x | 11.0.0–11.3.21 | vulnerable
row: Drupal 11.3.x | 11.3.22 | fixed
row: Drupal 10.6.x | before 10.6.22 | vulnerable
row: Drupal 10.6.x | 10.6.22 | fixed
row: Drupal 11.2.x, 10.5.x and older, 8, 9 | all | eol

Sites are at risk when install.php is reachable from the internet and the configuration meets conditions Drupal has not disclosed. Because the rating limits it to uncommon configurations, not every site will be exploitable, but without the details you can't rule yours out, so upgrade everything.

How to tell if you were compromised

Drupal has not published indicators of compromise. We suggest checking:

  1. Web server logs for requests to /core/install.php or /install.php (including variants with extra path, such as /core/install.php/…) from unknown addresses, especially POST requests answered with 200.
  2. The People admin page for administrator accounts nobody created, and for a changed email or password on user 1.
  3. Changes to sites/default/settings.php (modification time, different database credentials) and new PHP files under sites/default/files.
  4. Unusual processes running as the web server account (www-data, nginx, apache). Triage any addresses and hashes you find with our IOC extractor.

What to do

  1. Upgrade core to 11.4.13, 11.3.22 or 10.6.22 for your branch (with Composer: composer update drupal/core-recommended --with-all-dependencies, then drush updatedb and drush cache:rebuild).
  2. Block the installer at the web server, which Drupal recommends even after upgrading. In nginx, inside the HTTPS server block, add location ^~ /core/install.php { return 404; } (not an exact = match) and check with nginx -t. In Apache, add <Location "/core/install.php"> with Require all denied to the virtual host config.
  3. Make settings.php read-only: neither the file nor the sites/default directory should be writable by the web server account.
  4. Verify the block: curl -I https://your-site/core/install.php, and the same for /install.php and /core/install.php/foo, should return 403 or 404, never 200.
  5. Plan a move off unsupported branches (11.2, 10.5 and older); until then apply at least steps 2–4.

Timeline

Timeline of the SA-CORE-2026-017 fix in Drupal16 Nov 2026: Drupal announces a security release for all branches (PSA-2026-11-16); 18 Nov 2026: 11.4.13, 11.3.22 and 10.6.22 released with fixes for SA-CORE-2026-017 and -018; 19 Nov 2026: No confirmed exploitation; the advisory says a PoC exists16 Nov 2026Drupal announces a securityrelease for all branches(PSA-2026-11-16)18 Nov 202611.4.13, 11.3.22 and 10.6.22released with fixes forSA-CORE-2026-017 and -01819 Nov 2026No confirmed exploitation;the advisory says a PoCexists
Based on Drupal's advisories

FAQ

How do I check which Drupal version I run?

In the admin UI under Reports → Status report (/admin/reports/status), on the command line with `drush status`, or for Composer installs with `composer show drupal/core`. Anything below 10.6.22, 11.3.22 or 11.4.13 in its branch is vulnerable.

Is blocking install.php enough, without upgrading?

Not for good. Drupal recommends blocking the installer as an extra layer and as a stopgap; the real fix is the upgrade. Blocking it is still good practice afterwards: nobody on the internet needs the installer on a finished site.

I'm on an old 11.2 or 10.5 branch. Will I get a fix?

No. According to the advisory these branches, like Drupal 8 and 9, have no security coverage. Move to a supported branch; until then, block the installer and make sure the web server cannot write to settings.php.

Sources

  1. Drupal - SA-CORE-2026-017: Drupal core - Critical - Remote code execution (18 Nov 2026)
  2. Drupal - SA-CORE-2026-018: Drupal core - Moderately critical - Gadget chain (18 Nov 2026)
  3. Drupal - Securing the installer (install.php)
  4. Drupal - release 11.4.13
  5. Drupal - release 10.6.22

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