Actively exploited CVSS 9.8 Security news
Apache Axis 1.x flaw CVE-2026-90436 is under attack, and no fixed release is coming
On 18 November 2026 CISA added CVE-2026-90436 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The flaw sits in Apache Axis 1.x, an old Java library for SOAP web services. A crafted SOAP fault makes Axis load and instantiate an attacker-chosen class before any authentication check, which can lead to code execution (CVSS 9.8). Axis 1.x is end-of-life and the project will not ship a fixed release. Since 12 November attackers have been exploiting it in N-able N-central servers to install cryptominers.
Key points
- Affected: every Apache Axis 1.x release up to and including 1.4. The library has had no new release since 2006, but plenty of older enterprise Java applications still ship it.
- The bug: an inbound SOAP fault with an exceptionName element makes Axis load and construct the named class before checking that it is an AxisFault. This happens before service-level authentication runs (CWE-470).
- Exploited: yes. CISA has listed it in KEV since 18 Nov 2026 with a 21 Nov deadline; the 4EverAble2Shell chain has used it against N-central servers since 12 Nov.
- Fix: the Axis project does not plan a fixed 1.x release. It recommends moving to Axis 2/Java or another SOAP engine, or applying the fix commit yourself.
Vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-90436
What happened
On 18 November 2026 the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2026-90436 in Apache Axis 1.x to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. US federal agencies must deal with it by 21 November 2026. Because there is no fixed release, CISA allows other routes: vendor mitigations, or discontinuing the product. It also points to its forensic triage requirements, so agencies are expected to check whether they have already been compromised, not just to patch.
The Apache Axis project disclosed the flaw on 6 November 2026 in an advisory on oss-security, rated critical. It was found by José Apari-Pantigozo of OKIOK. The NVD record carries a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.8 and an "unsupported when assigned" tag: Axis 1.x reached end-of-life long ago, and the advisory says the project does not expect to ship a fixed 1.x release.
Exploitation is documented in N-able N-central, a remote monitoring and management platform that bundles Axis 1.x. The 4EverAble2Shell chain, published on 12 November, uses this bug for unauthenticated code execution and then escalates to root. huntback counted 21 compromised servers running the XMRig miner that same day. Details and indicators are in our separate N-central story. But Axis 1.x is a general-purpose library, not something unique to N-central, so other legacy applications may ship it too.
Technical details
- Component: Apache Axis 1.x, a SOAP web services library and runtime for Java; specifically the handling of inbound SOAP faults (
<Fault>). - Bug class: unsafe reflection, meaning attacker input chooses which class is loaded (CWE-470). When a fault contains an
exceptionNameelement, Axis loads the class with that name. If a string data element is also present, it constructs an instance through the class's String constructor, before checking that it is a subclass ofAxisFault. - Why this leads to code execution: loading a class runs its static initialiser, and a constructor can have side effects. With a suitable class on the application's classpath, an attacker can reach code execution, so the outcome depends on which other libraries the application ships.
- Preconditions: the attacker only needs to send Axis a SOAP message. According to the advisory, the fault is parsed before the per-service handler chains run, so authentication configured on a service does not stop the attack. A reachable SOAP endpoint is enough.
- The code fix: commit 41f3b4e8 loads the class named in the fault without initialising it, accepts it only if it is an
AxisFaultsubtype and refuses to construct anything else. It also adds regression tests.
Who is affected
- Every Apache Axis 1.x release up to and including 1.4, published in Maven as
axis:axisandorg.apache.axis:axis(per NVD). - Applications that bundle Axis 1.x and accept SOAP messages from untrusted networks. N-able N-central is confirmed and exploited. For other products, the vendor has to confirm the impact, so watch their security advisories.
- Axis 2/Java (
org.apache.axis2) is a separate project. The advisory names it as a replacement, not as an affected product.
How to tell if you were compromised
Neither the Apache Axis project nor CISA has published generic indicators of exploitation. For N-central, huntback and N-able have published indicators, which you will find in our N-central story. For other applications we suggest:
- Search web server or proxy logs for POST requests to SOAP endpoints (typically paths containing
/services/or/axis/) from unfamiliar addresses, especially bodies withFaultandexceptionNameelements. - Watch for processes started under the Java application server's account: shells (
sh,bash,cmd.exe,powershell),curl,wgetor unknown binaries in/tmp. - Look for signs of cryptomining, which attackers have been installing after a break-in: sustained high CPU, new
crontabentries and new keys inauthorized_keys. - You can quickly triage log and EDR output with our IOC extractor.
What to do
- Find out where you run Axis 1.x. Scan applications and containers for
axis.jar/axis-1.4.jarand theaxis:axisandorg.apache.axis:axisdependencies, and ask suppliers for an SBOM. - Keep SOAP endpoints off the internet. Where possible, allow them only from internal networks or over a VPN. On N-central, deploy hotfix 2026.4 HF3, which according to N-able blocks the Legacy API the chain attacks through.
- Plan a migration to Axis 2/Java or another supported SOAP engine, as the Apache Axis project recommends. In the meantime you can rebuild your own applications with the fix commit; no official release will include it.
- For third-party applications, ask the vendor for a fix or a statement that the product is not affected. If the vendor stays silent and the service is internet-facing, treat it as vulnerable.
- If you find signs of compromise, treat the server as fully compromised: isolate it, rotate every stored credential and rebuild it from a clean backup.
Timeline
Update
- 19 Nov 2026, 13:00 UTC – also exploited in Atlassian Confluence Data Center. Rapid7 saw this flaw used against a customer's Confluence Data Center server on 13 Nov: unauthenticated
POSTrequests to/plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2returned HTTP 500, yet the Java process immediately launchedbashandcurlas the Confluence service account. The attacker went on to query the Confluence database (page bodies, attachments, hunting for card numbers), tried AS-REP roasting against a domain controller and later signed in to Microsoft 365 as an integration service account. Only instances with Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) enabled are affected; it has been off by default for new installs since version 3.0. Atlassian (CONFSERVER-104610, CVSS 4.0 9.3) fixed the bug in 9.2.28, removed the feature entirely in 10.0, and Confluence Cloud is not affected. Until you upgrade, Rapid7 advises unticking "Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)" under General Configuration → Further Configuration (no restart needed, though integrations may break). Rapid7 says a Metasploit module for Confluence appeared on 17 Nov. Rapid7's indicators (defanged):192.238.253[.]176,5.133.47[.]243,163.182.68[.]109,104.13.106[.]166,*.trycloudflare[.]com,wpefh-192-238-253-176.free.pinggy[.]net,webhook[.]site. For N-central, Rapid7 recommends 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39), released 16 Nov, which disables the Legacy API. - 19 Nov 2026: first version.
FAQ
How do I find out whether my application includes Axis 1.x?
Look for axis.jar or axis-1.4.jar in application directories (for example WEB-INF/lib), and for axis:axis or org.apache.axis:axis in Maven and Gradle dependencies. A software composition analysis (SCA) scanner or a vendor SBOM also helps. Note that Axis 2 (org.apache.axis2) is a separate project and the advisory does not list it as affected.
My vendor has not shipped a fix. What should I do?
Ask the vendor directly whether the product bundles Axis 1.x and when a fix will ship. Until then, restrict SOAP endpoints (often under /services/ or /axis/) to the networks that genuinely need them, and watch your logs as described under How to tell if you were compromised.
Why is CISA's deadline so short?
CISA gave US federal agencies just three days, until 21 Nov 2026, and also points to its forensic triage requirements. That suggests it sees exploitation as widespread. The deadline is not binding on other organisations, but it is a useful guide to priority.
Sources
- CISA - Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, CVE-2026-90436 (added 18 Nov 2026)
- NVD - CVE-2026-90436
- oss-security - Apache Axis project advisory for CVE-2026-90436 (6 Nov 2026)
- Apache Axis - fix commit 41f3b4e8 "Prevent arbitrary class instantiation from SOAP fault exceptionName" (GitHub)
- huntback - N-central 4EverAble2Shell: miners on live servers (12 Nov 2026)
- Rapid7 - exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center (16 Nov 2026, updated 19 Nov)
- Atlassian - CONFSERVER-104610: Remote Code Execution in Confluence Data Center
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