Actively exploited Security news

BO Team rode an unpatched vCenter (Log4Shell) all the way to a server that signs industrial software

On 5 November 2026 Kaspersky ICS CERT described a months-long intrusion at a Russian developer of software used by industrial companies. According to the report, the attackers most likely exploited the four-year-old Log4Shell bug in VMware vCenter to reach the hypervisors, the domain controller and finally the server that signs the company's builds. Kaspersky says they never completed the supply chain attack. Here is the attack chain, the indicators and what to check in your own environment.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 4 minutes · For admins and analysts

Actively exploited: VMware vCenter, Linux

Key points

  • On 5 Nov 2026 Kaspersky ICS CERT published its analysis of an incident at an unnamed Russian software developer whose products are used mainly by industrial companies in Eastern Europe. The developer reported the incident in June 2025.
  • The attackers first logged in over internet-facing SSH with a service account that allowed passwords. Kaspersky says they then most likely exploited Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware vCenter 7.0.3, got root and used a stolen SSH key to reach the hypervisors.
  • They stayed for several months: they took over the domain controller, stole the mail server's DKIM key for phishing and reached the server that signs the company's commercial software builds.
  • Security software on the signing server blocked attempts to inject code. Kaspersky found no evidence that the attackers signed anything or that malicious software reached customers.
  • Kaspersky attributes the attack with high confidence to BO Team (Black Owl), mainly because of a near-identical lsass dumping command seen in an earlier attack.

What happened

Kaspersky ICS CERT published an analysis on 5 November 2026 of an incident at a Russian software developer whose commercial products are used mainly by industrial companies in Eastern Europe. It names neither the company nor the product. The developer reported the incident in June 2025.

The attackers were inside for several months. They moved from a Linux terminal server through the hypervisors to the domain controller and to the server that signs the company's software builds. Had they signed their own code there, it would have reached customers as a trusted update. Kaspersky says that did not happen: security software blocked the injection attempts and the report gives no evidence of signed malware.

Kaspersky attributes the attack with high confidence to BO Team (also known as Black Owl), a group that targets Russian organisations.

How the attack worked

BO Team's path from SSH to the code-signing server according to Kaspersky ICS CERT1. Internet-facing SSH, service account with a password; 2. Log4Shell in vCenter 7.0.3 – root shell (likely); 3. Stolen root SSH key – hypervisors and virtual machines; 4. Domain controller, Golden Ticket prep, DKIM key for phishing; 5. Attempt to inject code on the signing server – blocked1Internet-facing SSH, service accountwith a password2Log4Shell in vCenter 7.0.3 – rootshell (likely)3Stolen root SSH key – hypervisors andvirtual machines4Domain controller, Golden Ticketprep, DKIM key for phishing5Attempt to inject code on the signingserver – blocked
BO Team intrusion – based on the Kaspersky ICS CERT report (5 Nov 2026)
  • Initial access: the first attributable event is an SSH login to an internet-facing Linux terminal server using a service account that allowed password authentication.
  • vCenter: Kaspersky says the attackers most likely exploited Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware vCenter 7.0.3 - the researchers reproduced it on a test bench but have no direct proof. With root access they read the root SSH private key and reached the hypervisors.
  • Persistence: backdoors on hypervisors and VMs in the form of bash scripts disguised as PostgreSQL or VMware components, a tool derived from the public ReverseSSH project, and Global Socket (gsocket) for remote shells. A modified NX utility (nxnode-login) harvested credentials.
  • Windows and AD: lsass.exe dumping with Nanodump and comsvcs.dll, a copy of ntds.dit via ntdsutil, LOLBins (ie4uinit.exe, unregmp2.exe, fsquirt.exe), log deletion and timestomping.
  • Phishing: with the company's stolen DKIM key they sent phishing in late July that was signed as genuine company mail.
  • Once the response began, they tried to come back through reactivated backdoors on test machines and through phishing.

How to tell if you were compromised

Indicators from the Kaspersky ICS CERT report (defanged).

MD5:
346b04985ec6c5d107ba0ddf32fe7691  backdoor (bash)
5aa8c19c897176502cf8d8fc543fafc7  backdoor (bash)
6d12efa1db15121f88d58b9952e301ef  backdoor (bash)
b86690213f0155f7b3b65832301ed932  backdoor (bash)
68957de915e2a58339fa477f8078bdf4  ReverseSSH
5e04b2891635cbaa83ad619fe248e85b  downloader script
719e813e527920e83349e061b5b1590f  downloader script
86ff08749e77d5d078e929e5f9748504  downloader script
cb2908ef4cc042bfe856c84e9b61a2f9  Global Socket downloader

Domains and IPs:
lo1yaizaeghaevarooD1ahtaichootae.nofrillsdns[.]com
lo1yaizaeghaevarood1ahtaichootaz.nofrillsdns[.]com
vmware-timecheck-api.nofrillsdns[.]com
ip-223-6.dataclub[.]info
95.81.115[.]77
193.3.23[.]236
80.76.42[.]139

Paths (Linux):
/etc/cron.hourly/pgcache
/etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync
/usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate
/dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174
/usr/bin/nxnode-login

Kaspersky detections:
Backdoor.Shell.Agent.t
HEUR:Backdoor.Shell.Agent.o
Trojan.Shell.Agent.gc / .ge / .gf / .gg
HEUR:HackTool.Linux.ReverseSSH.gen

What else to hunt for:

  • unknown scripts in /etc/cron.hourly and binaries named after VMware or PostgreSQL that don't belong to any installed package, on hypervisors as well as VMs,
  • a process named exe (Kaspersky says the hypervisor backdoor used that name),
  • password-based SSH logins from the internet and root key logins originating from vCenter,
  • access to lsass.exe and rundll32.exe launching comsvcs.dll (MiniDump).

Paste log extracts into our IOC extractor and check files against the hashes with the hash calculator - both run entirely in your browser.

What to do

  1. Patch vCenter. VMware fixed Log4Shell in vCenter 7.0 Update 3c, 6.7 Update 3q and 6.5 Update 3s (January 2022). Older builds without the update are vulnerable, and vCenter should never face the internet.
  2. Harden SSH: no password or root logins from the internet, a low MaxAuthTries, access only from approved addresses.
  3. Isolate code-signing infrastructure from the general network, keep keys in an HSM, and log and review every signing operation.
  4. After an intrusion: isolate the affected subnets, reset all domain passwords, reset krbtgt twice, reissue keys and certificates (DKIM included) and review scheduled tasks. Kaspersky also recommends SIEM and EDR with at least 30 days of logs and backups kept outside the domain.
  5. MFA for VPN, RDP and critical systems, and ACLs restricting RDP, SSH, SCP and SMB.

Timeline

  • 10 Dec 2021 - Log4Shell disclosed and added to the CISA KEV catalog the same day.
  • January 2022 - VMware ships the fixed vCenter 7.0 U3c.
  • months before June 2025 - BO Team inside the developer's network (the report gives no exact start date).
  • June 2025 - the developer reports the incident to Kaspersky.
  • late July - phishing with the stolen DKIM key; the attackers also try to return through backdoors on test machines.
  • 5 Nov 2026 - Kaspersky ICS CERT publishes its analysis with indicators.

Verified against sources on 16 November 2026.

FAQ

Log4Shell dates from 2021 - why is this news?

Because unpatched systems are still out there and attackers still use them. The bug itself is old - VMware fixed it in vCenter in January 2022. What is new is how far the attackers got with it: to the server that signs software shipped to customers.

Did malicious software reach the developer's customers?

According to Kaspersky, no. Security software on the signing server blocked the code injection attempts, and the report gives no evidence of signed malware or of distribution to customers. Kaspersky does believe a supply chain attack was the goal.

Who is BO Team?

A group Kaspersky also calls Black Owl that targets Russian organisations. The report links it to Ukrainian IP addresses, well-written Russian-language phishing and long-term, low-noise operations. It does not claim any state sponsorship.

Should organisations outside Russia care?

Yes. The playbook - an unpatched vCenter, password SSH open to the internet, quiet persistence on hypervisors - works anywhere. Checking your vCenter build and SSH settings takes minutes.

Sources

  1. Kaspersky ICS CERT – Supply chain attack: BO Team in a software developer’s infrastructure (5 November 2026)
  2. Broadcom – Workaround instructions to address CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2021-45046 in vCenter Server (KB 318925)
  3. NVD – CVE-2021-44228

Spotted a mistake? Let us know and we will correct it openly.