Actively exploited Security news

Webworm hides inside government networks with a modified SoftEther VPN Bridge instead of malware

Rapid7 researchers published an analysis on 19 November 2026 of a tool they link to Webworm, a China-aligned group that targets government organisations, mainly in Europe. It is not classic malware but a rebuilt open-source SoftEther VPN Bridge that connects the attacker's network to the victim's internal network while posing as monitoring software. Antivirus products barely detect it.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 3 minutes · For admins and analysts

Actively exploited: Webworm spies on governments with a disguised SoftEther bridge

Key points

  • Rapid7 described on 19 Nov 2026 a rebuilt SoftEther VPN Bridge 4.44 (build 9807) that Webworm uses as a covert bridge into victims' internal networks.
  • The tool poses as Network Monitor Software, uses altered endpoints /update/alive.cgi and /update/picture.cgi and an encrypted setting.conf configuration.
  • The sample has been public since January, yet only one antivirus engine flagged it on VirusTotal at the time of analysis.
  • Rapid7 attributes it to Webworm with moderate confidence and does not describe how the attackers got in.

Rapid7 researchers published an analysis on 19 November 2026 of a tool found inside government networks. They link it to Webworm, a China-aligned group that focuses on governments, mainly in Europe. Rapid7 gives the attribution moderate confidence, based on the group's earlier techniques documented by ESET and on infrastructure in AS 20473 (Vultr). It does not name specific countries or agencies.

Why "zero lines of malware"

The tool is a rebuilt open-source SoftEther VPN Bridge, version 4.44 (build 9807). Rapid7 found no added malicious functionality - it does what a legitimate VPN bridge does: it connects the attacker's remote network to the victim's local network, as if the attacker's machine were plugged in at the office. The changes are all about staying unnoticed:

  • it presents itself as "Network Monitor Software" from a fictitious company, and in places as "NtMonitor VPN",
  • the stock SoftEther endpoints are replaced with innocuous-looking /update/alive.cgi and /update/picture.cgi,
  • the usual GIF handshake pattern is swapped for traffic disguised as a PNG image,
  • the program's resources are packed inside the executable,
  • the configuration is encrypted with a custom RC4-like cipher.

The sample has been public since January, yet at the time of analysis only one antivirus engine on VirusTotal flagged it. Antivirus alone will not catch this. Rapid7 does not describe how the attackers got in.

How Webworm's modified SoftEther VPN Bridge works, per Rapid71. The attacker gains a foothold in the agency's network (entry point not described by Rapid7); 2. They deploy netcapa.exe - a disguised SoftEther VPN Bridge running as the SEVPNBRIDGE service; 3. The bridge connects to the attacker's server over HTTPS and disguises traffic as images; 4. The attacker operates inside the internal network as if connected at the office1The attacker gains a foothold in theagency's network (entry point notdescribed by Rapid7)2They deploy netcapa.exe - a disguisedSoftEther VPN Bridge running as theSEVPNBRIDGE service3The bridge connects to the attacker'sserver over HTTPS and disguisestraffic as images4The attacker operates inside theinternal network as if connected atthe office
Simplified from Rapid7's analysis (19 Nov 2026)

How to tell if you were compromised

Indicators from Rapid7's analysis (full hashes and YARA rules are in Rapid7's GitHub repository, linked from their post):

netcapa.exe
SEVPNBRIDGE
setting.conf
/update/alive.cgi
/update/picture.cgi
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\SoftEtherVPN_Stable\SoftEtherVPN_Stable\SoftEtherVPN_Stable\src\DebugFiles\pdb\x64_Release\vpnbridge.pdb
RCEN
89 50 4e 47 0d 0a 1a 0a 00 00 00 0d 49 48 44 52
  • netcapa.exe is the original file name (version 4.44.0.9807), SEVPNBRIDGE the service name, and setting.conf the encrypted configuration starting with the bytes RCEN.
  • If you can inspect TLS, look for POST requests to /update/picture.cgi with Content-Type: image/jpeg whose body starts with the PNG header above.
  • More generally, hunt for SoftEther behaviour: a new service, firewall rules added by a program, and long-lived connections to VPS hosts. Names and endpoints are easy for the actor to change.

You can paste the list into our IOC extractor and convert it for your SIEM.

What to do

  1. Sweep servers and workstations for the indicators above and with Rapid7's YARA rules.
  2. Check whether you have any unapproved SoftEther or other VPN bridge on your network, and block it.
  3. Restrict servers' outbound connections to required destinations only; a bridge needs a long-lived outbound connection.
  4. If you find it, treat it as a breach: isolate the machine, preserve memory and logs, look for the entry point and report the incident to your national CERT.

Sources

  1. Rapid7 - Spying on Governments with Zero Lines of Malware: A Custom SoftEther Bridge in Webworm's Toolkit (19 Nov 2026)

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