Actively exploited Security news

Exposed open directory reveals a Russian-speaking operation that stole credentials from 603 PCs

Hunt.io researchers stumbled on an open directory on a Dutch VPS holding stolen data, scripts and C2 logs. The operators harvested browser passwords, password manager vaults, US bank and government logins, and Microsoft 365 sessions they replayed to get past multi-factor authentication.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 2 minutes · For admins and analysts

Actively exploited: HavoX / Phantom53

Key points

  • Hunt.io published its analysis on 18 November 2026. Implants beaconed to the C2 servers from 12 October to 8 November.
  • The operator's own log listed 603 implants across 469 distinct hostnames and more than 1.2 million beacon transactions.
  • The data came from victims' PCs, not from breaches at banks: Chrome and Edge passwords, LastPass, 1Password and KeePass vaults, Microsoft 365 sessions and credential files for 35 AI tools.
  • Hunt.io bases the Russian-speaking label on comments and logs in 249 files; it does not name a group or a state.

What happened

On 18 November 2026, Hunt.io published an analysis of an operation it uncovered thanks to the attackers' own mistake. On a VPS in the Netherlands (hosted by Podaon SIA), they had left an open directory on port 8124 with 1,692 files (about 1.1 GB): loot archives, scripts, C2 components and operational logs. The logs show 603 implants on 469 hostnames beaconing between 12 October and 8 November 2026.

According to Hunt.io, no bank or agency was breached. Everything came off victims' machines: at least 57 victims had US bank or government logins stored, and at least 46 had accounts with federal identity services such as ID.me and Login.gov. The haul included a LastPass vault with 2,880 logins, cracked 1Password master passwords for two victims, a KeePass database, 3,345 decrypted Chrome and Edge logins, records from 44 crypto platforms and credential files for 35 AI tools. Stolen Microsoft 365 sessions let the operators bypass MFA in two tenants.

How the attack works

How the operation works according to Hunt.io1. The victim runs a .pyw script that launches silently via pythonw.exe and persists in AppData\Roaming; 2. The implant beacons to the HavoX C2 through 12 Cloudflare Workers domains; 3. The Phantom53 task broker and Kraken bridge push scripts that drain browsers, password managers and sessions; 4. The operators install ScreenConnect or Level.io so access survives removal of the implant; 5. Loot is uploaded to the Dutch server and a secondary server in the US1The victim runs a .pyw script thatlaunches silently via pythonw.exe andpersists in AppData\Roaming2The implant beacons to the HavoX C2through 12 Cloudflare Workers domains3The Phantom53 task broker and Krakenbridge push scripts that drainbrowsers, password managers andsessions4The operators install ScreenConnector Level.io so access survivesremoval of the implant5Loot is uploaded to the Dutch serverand a secondary server in the US
Attack chain based on Hunt.io's analysis (November 2026)

Hunt.io maps initial access to phishing but has not published details of the lure. It bases the Russian-speaking label on comments and logs in 249 files and Russian text on the panel login page; it does not attribute the operation to a named group or state.

How to tell if you're affected

Indicators from Hunt.io (defanged):

# C2 and exfiltration
145.63.138[.]67      primary C2 and loot server (ports 8000, 8080, 8082, 8124–8126)
66.165.246[.]77      secondary exfiltration, port 11603
146.70.24[.]172      external Kraken panel
sync-node-serv[.]com one-time task URLs (:8080/t/<token>)

# Cloudflare Workers (C2 fronts)
3k7d7v5hn.workers[.]dev
bog1hav1ged3-1jtn.workers[.]dev
busykifukek2-8psk.workers[.]dev
fep0bupuhag2-o0kk.workers[.]dev
fypahedupal2-0maz.workers[.]dev
j1nanyd1jot2-lwml.workers[.]dev
l0mad1fugiv2-7mtj.workers[.]dev
nelol0k0tys3-jbne.workers[.]dev
sekolonozus3-erij.workers[.]dev
tej0kygaj0g3-tad7.workers[.]dev
vajowigus0p3-yw4k.workers[.]dev
zetogebuw1s2-5hzu.workers[.]dev

# Endpoint artifacts
AppData\Roaming\<hex>\<hex>.pyw launched by pythonw.exe
BuildID 4444444, MagicValue 0xdeadbeef (HavoX header values)

Hunt.io did not publish file hashes. Our IOC extractor turns the list into clean input for a SIEM or firewall.

What to hunt for without indicators: pythonw.exe with an unusual parent process, .pyw scripts in AppData\Roaming, uniform POST intervals to *.workers.dev, and ScreenConnect or Level.io installs IT doesn't know about.

What to do

  1. Search DNS, proxy and EDR logs for the indicators above.
  2. Audit remote management tools – remove unapproved ScreenConnect and Level.io agents and find out who installed them.
  3. Harden Microsoft 365: Conditional Access bound to device compliance, Continuous Access Evaluation and shorter refresh token lifetimes.
  4. Protect AI tool credential files (such as ~/.claude/.credentials.json and ~/.codex/auth.json) like SSH keys, and keep API keys in a secrets manager.
  5. If you find traces, isolate and reimage the machine. Change passwords and revoke sessions from a clean device – including everything stored in the password manager.

Updates

  • 20 Nov 2026: first version.

FAQ

Was a bank or government agency breached?

No. According to Hunt.io, the operators never broke into a bank or agency – they took the credentials straight from victims' computers. Don't wait for a breach notice from your bank; what matters is whether your own machine is infected.

Does multi-factor authentication help?

Only partly. The operators stole Microsoft 365 session cookies and replayed them to get past MFA. Device-bound sessions, Conditional Access and fast session revocation are what close that gap.

Are victims outside the US affected?

Hunt.io focuses on US victims and says most geography is hidden because every callback went through Cloudflare Workers. The indicators are worth hunting for anywhere. In the UK, report incidents to the NCSC; in the US, to CISA or the FBI's IC3.

Sources

  1. Hunt.io – US bank and federal logins stolen off victims' own PCs by a Russian-speaking operation (18 Nov 2026)

Spotted a mistake? Let us know and we will correct it openly.