Actively exploited Security news
Unit 42: Com-affiliated crews phone staff as IT support, hijack logins and MFA, then extort the victims
On 20 November 2026 Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 published an analysis of attacks by crews from the so-called Com ecosystem, including Bling Libra (ShinyHunters). The attacker calls an employee pretending to be IT support, steers them to a fake sign-in page, captures the password and MFA approval in real time and pulls data out of the cloud. Then comes extortion. Financial services, healthcare and legal firms are the main targets.
Key points
- Unit 42 describes seven linked crews in the Com ecosystem, including Bling Libra (ShinyHunters) and newer clusters it calls Redact, Pink, Falcon, Helix, Vortex and Cinder. They frequently share infrastructure.
- It starts with a call from 'IT support'. An adversary-in-the-middle phishing page – often built with the Doko's Panel kit – captures the password, session token and MFA approval. The attacker then enrols their own MFA device, sometimes within minutes.
- Data leaves via Python scripts and Microsoft Graph from mailboxes, OneDrive and SharePoint. In some cases, Unit 42 says, tens of millions of CRM and recruiting records were taken.
- Helix used a fake 'Google Chrome' extension sideloaded in Developer Mode that steals cookies, logs keystrokes and streams the webcam. Unit 42 published hashes, domains and IP addresses.
What happened
Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 published an analysis on 20 November 2026 of attacks by crews it places in the Com ecosystem. It says it has been responding to these intrusions since early 2026 and that its telemetry shows a marked acceleration from August 2026. The crews include Bling Libra (ShinyHunters), active since 2019, and newer 2026 clusters named Redact (formerly BlackFile), Pink, Falcon, Helix, Vortex and Cinder.
How the attack works
- The call: the attacker poses as IT support and directs the victim to a page tailored to their company, such as
{company}.mfaregister[.]comor a Cloudflare Pages redirect. - Session capture: an adversary-in-the-middle proxy (often the Doko's Panel kit) captures credentials, session tokens and MFA approvals. In one financial services case the victim went through the full sequence, including number matching.
- Persistence: new MFA devices, sometimes within minutes (Vortex reused a device named 'Pixel 10a' across accounts), unauthorised OAuth apps, temporary cloud credentials and secondary accounts. Sign-ins come through residential proxies and commercial VPNs.
- Exfiltration: Python scripts (
python-httpx,python-requests), the Microsoft Graph SDK and Rclone. Cinder replayed a persistent 'keep me signed in' session token. - Extortion: threats posted in the victim's internal channels, threats to report the breach to regulators, and repeat approaches weeks after a failed attempt.
According to Unit 42, Helix also used two fake 'Google Chrome' extensions (versions 1.6.111 and 1.6.112) sideloaded in Developer Mode from oskeysetup[.]com. They log keystrokes, steal Microsoft and Google cookies, clipboard contents and browser storage, take hidden screenshots and stream the webcam.
Who is affected
Mainly financial services, healthcare and legal, plus construction, high tech and transport. Most targets are in the US; Australia's share rose from under 1% of observed subdomains in August and September to about 13% in October.
How to tell if you were hit
A selection of Unit 42's indicators (defanged; the full list of about 70 domains is at the source):
930898e8b65e9cf4e2595ac4092042a707cca8922751e723ad8b86260655154a # folderextension.crx
ea8d30c42e758559e78bd1fe97f8849011beb7f24c7f092a066a5a62fa7fbe6f # folderextension.zip
oskeysetup[.]com # fake extension distribution
31.42.184[.]213 # hosted oskeysetup[.]com
193.149.176[.]62 # accessed compromised accounts
add-mfa[.]com
auth-sso[.]com
enrollmfa[.]com
mfaregister[.]com
login-options[.]com
apply-passkey[.]com
installpasskey[.]com
kiota-dotnet/1.17.1 # user agent – only with other signals
Microsoft.Graph.Client/6.2.0 # user agent – only with other signals
python-requests/2.34.2 # user agent – only with other signals
In identity logs, look for a new MFA device registered shortly after sign-in, new OAuth consents and sign-ins from residential proxies. In Microsoft 365, look for bulk downloads from mailboxes, OneDrive and SharePoint. On endpoints, look for Chrome extensions loaded in Developer Mode. Our IOC extractor pulls domains out of your own logs quickly.
What to do
- Help desk: verify callers by calling back a known number or through their manager, never only on details they volunteer. Don't reset MFA on the strength of a phone call.
- Phishing-resistant MFA: FIDO2 security keys or passkeys, starting with admins and help desk staff.
- MFA and OAuth registrations: alert on every new MFA device and app consent, and require approval where possible.
- Browser extensions: allowlist only, with Developer Mode disabled by policy.
- If you suspect compromise: revoke all sessions and refresh tokens, remove rogue MFA devices and OAuth apps, and only then reset the password.
Updates
- 21 Nov 2026: first version.
FAQ
What is the Com?
Unit 42 uses the term for a loose ecosystem of cybercrime crews that frequently share infrastructure. The best known is Bling Libra, also called ShinyHunters. Unit 42 tracks the other clusters under its own names; it says Helix, Vortex and Cinder overlap with the group Google tracks as UNC6671.
Isn't push-based MFA enough?
No. An adversary-in-the-middle page relays the sign-in to the real service in real time, so the victim approves the MFA prompt – even with number matching – and the attacker receives a valid session. Domain-bound MFA, meaning FIDO2 security keys and passkeys, defeats this.
Should we block the listed user agents?
Not blindly. Strings such as python-requests or Microsoft.Graph.Client are also used by legitimate scripts and integrations. Treat them as a lead to investigate alongside a new MFA device registration, sign-ins via residential proxies or VPNs, and bulk downloads.
Sources
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