Actively exploited Security news

Mandiant: Russia's COLD RELIC (formerly COLDRIVER) used MFA fatigue and rogue passkeys to empty Google Workspace tenants

Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant published two linked intrusions at US organisations on 17 November 2026. COLD RELIC, the group previously tracked as COLDRIVER and Star Blizzard, got in with stolen admin credentials and MFA push fatigue, then kept access for months through passkeys and MFA devices it had enrolled itself. Password resets alone did not remove it.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 3 minutes · For admins and analysts

Actively exploited: COLD RELIC (COLDRIVER)

Key points

  • Mandiant documented two linked intrusions at US organisations (late 2025 and 2026) by COLD RELIC, a group the US Department of Justice places inside Russia's FSB.
  • Way in: stolen super admin credentials plus MFA push fatigue through a residential proxy near the victim; in the second case an impersonated employee on an encrypted messenger sent links that stole Entra ID tokens.
  • Persistence through attacker-enrolled passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices survived password and session resets; data left via mass Drive downloads, external sharing and a tenant-wide Customer Takeout.
  • Google published no IOCs, but did publish detection ideas for Workspace admin logs, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK.

On 17 November 2026 Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant published a case study of two linked intrusions by COLD RELIC, a Russian state-backed espionage group Google previously tracked as COLDRIVER (UNC4057). Other vendors call it Star Blizzard, Callisto or Gossamer Bear. According to Google, the US Department of Justice has assessed that the group operates within Russia's FSB; in December 2023 the NCSC and its partners linked Star Blizzard to FSB Centre 18.

What matters for defenders is less the attribution than the method. No malware is named in the report. Everything happens in the identity layer of Google Workspace and Microsoft Entra ID, which is exactly where many SOCs have the thinnest visibility.

How the intrusions worked

In the first case (late 2025) the attacker logged in with stolen super admin credentials through a US residential proxy close to the victim's location and kept sending MFA push requests until one was accepted. It immediately registered a new device. Access lasted several months.

In the second case (2026) COLD RELIC used what it had stolen in the first. It impersonated an employee of the first organisation on an encrypted messaging app, built a plausible conversation and sent links. A compromised website redirected the victim to a phishing page that captured credentials and tokens for Entra ID, which was the federated sign-in for the victim's Google Workspace. The victim was then forwarded to a document matching the conversation.

Five stages of the COLD RELIC intrusions described by Mandiant1. Stolen admin credentials or a phishing link from an impersonated contact; 2. MFA push fatigue or Entra ID token theft via a residential proxy near the victim; 3. Enrols own passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices; 4. Mass Drive download, external sharing, Customer Takeout, OAuth mail sync; 5. Deletes alerts, queries audit logs, reuses contact lists for the next lure1Stolen admin credentials ora phishing link from an impersonatedcontact2MFA push fatigue or Entra ID tokentheft via a residential proxy nearthe victim3Enrols own passkeys, backup codes andMFA devices4Mass Drive download, externalsharing, Customer Takeout, OAuth mailsync5Deletes alerts, queries audit logs,reuses contact lists for the nextlure
COLD RELIC intrusion chain (based on the GTIG and Mandiant case study)

Once inside, the group exported data through bulk Drive downloads and sharing to an attacker-controlled account, a domain-wide Customer Takeout, OAuth mail sync to external clients and searches for .pst files and passwords. It also took employee lists, CVs and event schedules to craft future lures, deleted Alert Center alerts and ran audit log queries.

How to tell if you were targeted

Google published no IOCs. Its detection table for Workspace admin logs is the useful part:

  • several MFA challenges for one user followed by success from the same IP,
  • Passkey enrolled or Device Registered shortly after such a burst,
  • logins using a backup code from an unusual network,
  • CUSTOMER_TAKEOUT_CREATED, User List Download from an unknown device, spikes in Drive downloads or external sharing to freemail,
  • new OAuth Authorize events granting https://mail.google.com/ to unapproved clients,
  • Batch Delete Operation Performed on alerts, especially government-backed attack warnings, and Investigation Query by unexpected users.

What to do

  1. Phishing-resistant MFA for admins: FIDO2/WebAuthn security keys instead of push, SMS or voice; Google suggests its Advanced Protection Program for high-risk users.
  2. Control enrolment: require admin approval or out-of-band verification for new MFA devices and passkeys, and audit existing passkeys on admin accounts.
  3. Evict properly: revoke all sessions, refresh tokens and OAuth grants in both Workspace and Entra ID, and delete rogue passkeys, backup codes and devices. A password reset alone is not enough.
  4. Network context: enrich sign-in logs with residential proxy and VPN reputation and alert when a privileged account suddenly appears on a consumer ISP.
  5. Limit the blast radius: DLP for mass and external sharing, disable Takeout where it is not needed and keep credentials out of cloud drives.

Our guide to a hijacked account covers the same "revoke everything, not just the password" logic for individuals.

FAQ

Is COLD RELIC a new group?

No. It is the new Google name for the group previously tracked as COLDRIVER and UNC4057, also known as Star Blizzard, Callisto and Gossamer Bear. Google says it has tracked its phishing since 2015, and Western cyber agencies linked it to FSB Centre 18 in December 2023.

Why did password resets not help?

The attacker had enrolled its own passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices, and kept hijacked sessions alive. Those survive a password change. Mandiant recommends revoking all sessions, refresh tokens and OAuth grants in both Google Workspace and Entra ID and deleting every unauthorised passkey and MFA device.

Are there indicators of compromise to block?

The report contains no domains, IP addresses or hashes. Hunt by behaviour instead: passkey or device enrolment after a burst of MFA prompts, Customer Takeout, bulk Drive downloads and deleted security alerts.

Sources

  1. Google Threat Intelligence Group - COLD RELIC: A Case Study in Impersonation and Compromise (17 Nov 2026)
  2. NCSC UK - Star Blizzard continues spear-phishing campaigns (7 Dec 2023)

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