Actively exploited Security news
Trezor confirms hidden implants in three Safe 5 wallets sold by CryptoBilis; firmware 2.13.1 neutralises them
Hardware wallet maker Trezor confirmed on 12 November 2026 that three Trezor Safe 5 units sold through the Asian reseller CryptoBilis contain an extra circuit board between the main board and the display. The board copies the recovery phrase whenever it appears on screen and sends it, encrypted, over the mobile network to the attackers. Firmware 2.13.1 shuts these implants down, but it cannot protect a phrase that was captured earlier. Anyone who bought a Trezor from CryptoBilis since March 2026 should move their funds to a new wallet with a new phrase.
Key points
- On 12 Nov 2026 Trezor confirmed an implant in three Safe 5 wallets bought from CryptoBilis between 20 August and 23 September 2026. One unit was examined in Trezor's lab; the other two were identified from photos sent by their owners.
- The implant is an add-on board between the main board and the display. It does not touch the firmware or the Secure Element; it only copies what is on screen, including recovery words during backup or restore, and any passphrase.
- Captured data is encrypted and sent over the mobile network to an attacker-controlled server. If it cannot connect, it holds the data and keeps retrying.
- According to Trezor, firmware 2.13.1 (11 Nov 2026) stops the implants found so far from capturing anything. It cannot rescue a phrase the implant already copied.
- Trezor says the implant works the same way as those found in Ledger devices, which Ledger disclosed on 15 Oct 2026. Trezor has not said who planted them.
What happened
Hardware wallet maker Trezor published the findings of its investigation into former authorised Southeast Asian reseller CryptoBilis on 12 November 2026. It confirmed an added circuit board (implant) in three Trezor Safe 5 wallets. Trezor's lab examined one of them - the unit a customer reported on 28 October through its responsible disclosure programme - and identified the other two from photos of the internals sent by their owners.
All three were bought between 20 August and 23 September 2026 from CryptoBilis's stores on the Tokopedia and Shopee marketplaces or directly from CryptoBilis. Trezor says no customer has reported losing funds so far. 48 customers have come forward since its October appeal.
Trezor also said it has cut its reseller network by about 80%. The resellers that remain must meet stricter rules on how devices are sourced, stored and who can access them.
How the implant works
According to Trezor, the implant only listens: it copies whatever is shown on the display, including what the user types in. It does not modify the firmware or the Secure Element, so device authenticity and firmware checks will not flag it. It captures the recovery phrase both when a backup is created and when the words are entered during a restore, along with any passphrase displayed on screen. It encrypts the data and sends it over the mobile network to a server controlled by the attackers; if it cannot connect, it keeps the data and retries until it succeeds.
Trezor says the implant works the same way as those found in Ledger devices, adapted to the Safe 5 display. Ledger disclosed its own case on 15 October 2026: attackers bought genuine devices, opened them and fitted custom components designed to capture the recovery phrase during setup, with sales going through resellers in Southeast Asia. Trezor says it will not publish technical details that could help other attackers.
Who is affected
- Affected purchases: only units from CryptoBilis, according to Trezor. Its advice to move funds, and the replacement offer, apply to every Trezor model bought from CryptoBilis since March 2026, even though the implant has so far only turned up in the Safe 5.
- Other channels: Trezor checked devices from its other regional resellers and found no tampering, and has no confirmed cases outside CryptoBilis. For future purchases it recommends buying directly from trezor.io.
- Losses: none reported yet. But anyone who used a CryptoBilis device to create or restore a wallet should assume the phrase may have been taken.
How to tell if you were compromised
Trezor does not describe any external signs. It checked units in its lab or from photos of the internals, and explicitly advises against weighing or opening the device - a scale, it says, can neither confirm nor rule out tampering.
What matters is where the device came from: if you bought it from CryptoBilis, or you do not know its origin, treat it as compromised. Trezor has not published indicators of compromise such as server addresses or SIM details.
What to do
If you bought a Trezor from CryptoBilis (Trezor's guidance):
- Move your funds to a new wallet with a freshly generated phrase. Restoring the old phrase on a different device does not solve the problem. If you have no other secure hardware wallet, you can temporarily move funds to a software wallet or an exchange you trust - and check the full receiving address before sending.
- Keep the CryptoBilis device, and do not use or set it up until Trezor tells you what to do next.
- Request a replacement via trezor.io/support. Depending on shipping rules, Trezor offers a different model with a refund of the price difference, delivery to another country, or a refund.
- Update to firmware 2.13.1 (released 11 November 2026 for Safe 7, Safe 5, Safe 3 and Model T). Trezor says it neutralises the implants found so far - but it cannot protect a phrase that was already captured.
All hardware wallet owners: never share your recovery phrase with anyone, including "support". Trezor warns that scammers are exploiting the incident through emails, letters and phone calls. Check any suspicious link in such a message with our Link checker, and if you have already typed your phrase into a third-party site, see our guide Investment scam: how to spot one and what to do. Buy wallets directly from the manufacturer.
Timeline
- March 2026 - Trezor's advice covers CryptoBilis purchases from this month onward.
- 20 Aug-23 Sep 2026 - the three implanted Safe 5 units are bought.
- 9 Oct 2026 - Trezor removes CryptoBilis from its reseller network; the same day Ledger starts investigating fund losses among CryptoBilis customers.
- 15 Oct 2026 - Ledger publishes its warning about implants in its devices.
- 28 Oct 2026 - a customer reports a suspected implant in a Safe 5 to Trezor.
- 30 Oct 2026 - Trezor issues its first warning and appeal to CryptoBilis buyers.
- 11 Nov 2026 - firmware 2.13.1 is released.
- 12 Nov 2026 - Trezor confirms the implant in three Safe 5 units.
Updates
- 13 Nov 2026 - first version. Facts checked against Trezor's blog (30 Oct and 12 Nov) and Ledger's statement (15 Oct).
FAQ
I bought my Trezor from trezor.io or another shop. Am I affected?
According to Trezor, no. It has found implants only in Safe 5 units from CryptoBilis, checked devices from its other regional resellers without finding tampering, and has no confirmed cases elsewhere. If you are unsure where your device came from, contact support via trezor.io/support.
Is updating to firmware 2.13.1 enough?
Not if you have already used a CryptoBilis device. The update stops the implant from capturing anything new, but a recovery phrase that was shown on screen before may already be gone. That is why Trezor tells buyers to move funds to a new wallet with a new phrase.
Can I weigh or open the device to check for an implant?
Trezor specifically advises against it: a scale can neither confirm nor rule out tampering. Keep the device and work with Trezor Support. Do not set it up or enter any existing recovery phrase on it.
Someone claiming to be Trezor support called me about the implant. What now?
Trezor warns that scammers are exploiting the incident through emails, letters and phone calls. Trezor Support will never ask for your recovery phrase. Hang up and deal only through trezor.io/support. If you did share your phrase, move your funds to a new wallet immediately.
Sources
- Trezor - Our CryptoBilis investigation: What we found and what we've changed (12 Nov 2026)
- Trezor - Implant reported in a Trezor sold by CryptoBilis (30 Oct 2026)
- Trezor - Firmware changelog, all versions and release dates (firmware 2.13.1, 11 Nov 2026)
- Ledger - Response to hardware implant attack (15 Oct 2026)
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