Actively exploited Reported – not yet confirmed Security news

Rackspace Spot: attackers with leaked credentials read secrets in customer clusters

Rackspace is warning customers of its Rackspace Spot Kubernetes platform about a breach, according to BleepingComputer on 21 November 2026: on 17 November an attacker logged in with leaked credentials, ran their own pods in clusters and could read Kubernetes Secrets. Customers are told to reissue tokens and rotate every secret stored in their clusters.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 2 minutes · For admins and analysts

Actively exploited: Rackspace Spot

Key points

  • If your Secrets held database passwords, cloud storage keys or Git tokens, assume the attacker may have them.
  • According to the report, Rackspace revoked affected tokens and sessions, removed the rogue pods, and the service has been running again since 21 Nov.

According to BleepingComputer, Rackspace has sent customers of its Rackspace Spot platform a security incident notification. We have not found a public statement on Rackspace's site, so everything below is the outlet's account.

What is known

  • How the attacker got in: Rackspace says an unauthorised party used "leaked credentials" to access parts of the platform.
  • When: on 17 November, roughly between 00:20 and 22:00 UTC. Rackspace learned of it on 18 November from a customer report. The management console was then offline for days, so customers could not rotate credentials. It announced full restoration on 21 November.
  • What the attacker could do: in some customer organisations they acted as a legitimate user, creating pods, reading Kubernetes Secrets and listing nodes and volumes. That means they could read any secret in affected clusters, plus the affected user's Spot API tokens and refresh tokens.
  • What Rackspace did: revoked tokens and sessions, removed the rogue pods, rotated keys and tightened monitoring.

What is not known

How many customers are affected, whether the attacker actually took data out of the clusters, and what the rogue pods were for. Rackspace did not answer the outlet's questions on these points.

How to check for compromise

Indicators from Rackspace's notice as quoted by the outlet (defanged):

23.224.79[.]106
23.224.0[.]0/15
pods and objects prefixed: i1  glm-  probe

Search for them in your Kubernetes audit log and in logs of systems your clusters could reach. Our IOC extractor pulls the addresses out of raw logs.

What to do now

  1. Reissue Spot API tokens, replace refresh tokens used in automation (CI/CD, Terraform) and download a fresh kubeconfig.
  2. Rotate every secret stored in Secrets: database passwords, cloud storage keys, container registry and Git tokens, third-party API keys.
  3. Review logs back to 17 November for databases, registries, repositories, storage and third-party services: sign-ins from unfamiliar addresses, new keys, unusual downloads.
  4. List pods, jobs and DaemonSets across your clusters and look for anything you did not start (kubectl get pods,jobs,daemonsets -A).

We will upgrade this report to verified once Rackspace describes the incident publicly.

Sources

  1. BleepingComputer - Rackspace Spot breach let hackers access customer Kubernetes secrets (21 Nov 2026)

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