Critical CVSS 9.3 Security news

Cyrus SASL: an SRP flaw lets attackers in without a password, but only some builds are affected

Cyrus SASL up to version 2.1.28 has a critical flaw in its SRP mechanism: a network attacker can log in as any existing user without knowing the password. A 9.1 to 9.3 rating does not mean every mail or directory server is at risk, though. SRP is off by default and Debian explicitly leaves it out of its packages. There is no fixed release yet.

Kyberkit editorial team · · event date · reading time 5 minutes · For admins and analysts

Critical: Cyrus SASL, CVE-2026-129483, CVSS 9.3

Key points

  • The SRP mechanism in Cyrus SASL up to 2.1.28 does not reject a client public value A that is a multiple of the modulus N. An attacker can force a zero shared secret and log in as any existing user without the password.
  • NVD published the record on 15 November 2026 with a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.1 and a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.3 (critical). A researcher reported the bug to the project on 31 July 2026.
  • SRP is only compiled in with the --enable-srp build option, which defaults to no. Debian explicitly disables SRP in its packages.
  • There is no fixed release; the latest version, 2.1.28, dates from February 2022. On 12 November 2026 the maintainers removed the SRP plugin from the development branch entirely.

Vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-129483

What happened

Cyrus SASL is a library that many server programs use to authenticate users, mail and directory servers in particular. It supports several authentication mechanisms, including the lesser-known SRP (Secure Remote Password).

On 15 November 2026 NVD published CVE-2026-129483, assigned by VulnCheck: the SRP mechanism in Cyrus SASL up to version 2.1.28 lets an unauthenticated attacker log in as any existing user without the password and learn the session keys.

A researcher using the handle afldl reported the bug on the project's GitHub on 31 July 2026, together with a test case. The maintainers did not respond. On 9 October, Alan Coopersmith of Oracle flagged the unresolved Cyrus SASL issues on the oss-security list, noting there had been no new release since 2022. On 12 November the maintainers removed the SRP plugin from the development branch altogether, saying the SRP SASL mechanism was never standardized.

How serious is it

Item Value
CVSS 3.1 9.1 (critical), AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS 4.0 9.3 (critical)
Weakness CWE-287 – Improper Authentication
Exploitation none reported, not in CISA KEV (15 Nov 2026)
Fixed release none yet

The score overstates the practical impact. SRP is rarely used, and it only ends up in the library when it is built with --enable-srp, which defaults to "no" in the 2.1.28 source. Where SRP is enabled, however, this is a complete password bypass with no user interaction.

Technical details

During an SRP login, the client and server exchange public values and each derives the same shared secret. That lets the client prove it knows the password without sending it. The SRP specification (RFC 5054) therefore requires the server to reject a client public value A that is a multiple of the modulus N, because such a value forces a result that does not depend on the password.

According to the report and the NVD record, srp_server_mech_step2 in plugins/srp.c only checks that A is greater than zero. If a client sends A equal to N, the shared secret becomes zero, the session key is something the attacker can compute in advance, and the server accepts the attacker's proof as valid. All the attacker needs is the name of an existing account. As a matter of policy, we do not describe how to exploit it.

How CVE-2026-129483 in the Cyrus SASL SRP mechanism works1. Attacker picks an existing account; 2. Sends a public value A equal to the modulus N; 3. Server does not reject it and the secret becomes zero; 4. Attacker computes the session key and is logged in1Attacker picks an existing account2Sends a public value A equal to themodulus N3Server does not reject it and thesecret becomes zero4Attacker computes the session key andis logged in
Why the server accepts a login without a password (per the report and NVD)

Who is affected

Cyrus SASL up to and including 2.1.28 (and the development branch before 12 November 2026) is vulnerable, but only where both of these apply:

  1. the library was built with the SRP plugin (--enable-srp),
  2. the service using the library offers the SRP mechanism to clients.

Debian packages pass --disable-srp and --disable-srp-setpass at build time, so they do not include the SRP plugin. We have not verified other distributions, container images or custom builds.

Vulnerable Cyrus SASL builds and the development branchCyrus SASL with --enable-srp up to 2.1.28: Vulnerable; Development branch (SRP removed) from 12 Nov 2026: FixedBuildVersionStatusCyrus SASLwith--enable-srpup to 2.1.28VulnerableDevelopmentbranch (SRPremoved)from 12 Nov2026Fixed
Status per NVD and the project repository (15 Nov 2026); default builds and Debian packages do not include SRP

How to check a server (our recommendation):

  • Look in the SASL plugin directory (for example /usr/lib/sasl2 or /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2) for a libsrp.so file.
  • The pluginviewer tool (saslpluginviewer on some distributions) lists the available mechanisms; look for SRP.
  • Check the mech_list option in each service's SASL configuration. If it is set and does not include SRP, the service does not offer it.

How to tell if you were compromised

Neither the maintainers nor VulnCheck have published indicators of compromise, and no exploitation has been reported. If you have SRP enabled, we recommend:

  • Search your service logs (mail, LDAP and others) for successful logins using the SRP mechanism. If you do not knowingly use SRP, treat every such login as suspicious.
  • Review logins from unusual addresses. You can pull the addresses from a log export into a list with our IOC extractor, which runs entirely in your browser.

What to do

  1. Check whether you have the SRP plugin (see above). If not, there is nothing else to do.
  2. Disable SRP: set mech_list in each service's SASL configuration to only the mechanisms you actually use, or remove the libsrp.so plugin. Common clients do not use SRP.
  3. Build without --enable-srp if you compile Cyrus SASL yourself.
  4. If SRP was enabled, review the logs as described above, force password changes on suspicious accounts and terminate their sessions.
  5. Watch for a new Cyrus SASL release and your distribution's security notices. You can recalculate the score for your environment in our CVSS calculator.

Timeline

Timeline of CVE-2026-129483 in Cyrus SASL22 Feb 2022: Latest release, 2.1.28, ships; 31 Jul 2026: Researcher reports the bug to the project (issue #896); 9 Oct 2026: Unresolved bugs flagged on oss-security; 12 Nov 2026: Maintainers remove the SRP plugin from the development branch; 15 Nov 2026: NVD publishes CVE-2026-12948322 Feb 2022Latest release, 2.1.28, ships31 Jul 2026Researcher reports the bug tothe project (issue #896)9 Oct 2026Unresolved bugs flagged onoss-security12 Nov 2026Maintainers remove the SRPplugin from the developmentbranch15 Nov 2026NVD publishes CVE-2026-129483
From the report to the CVE (GitHub, oss-security, NVD)

Updates

  • 15 November 2026 (evening) – The Debian Security Tracker now lists the flaw. For the cyrus-sasl2 package it shows every release (bookworm, trixie, forky, sid) as "vulnerable" with no fixed version, but rates the urgency "unimportant" and notes that Debian builds the library with --disable-srp. That confirms standard Debian installations are not affected. Red Hat has no record for the CVE yet, and no new Cyrus SASL release is out.
  • 15 November 2026 – first version of this article.

FAQ

I run Postfix or OpenLDAP with Cyrus SASL. Am I at risk?

Only if the library was built with the SRP plugin and the service offers SRP to clients. Debian does not build SRP. For other distributions and custom builds, check using the steps under Who is affected.

Why is a bug reported in July only news now?

The report sat unanswered for months. The CVE and the NVD record came out on 15 November 2026, three days after the maintainers removed the SRP plugin from the development branch.

When will a fixed version ship?

The maintainers have not announced a date, and the last release, 2.1.28, is from 2022. Until then, the fix is to disable SRP, which does not affect typical deployments.

Sources

  1. NVD – CVE-2026-129483
  2. VulnCheck – Cyrus SASL through 2.1.28 SRP Authentication Bypass via plugins/srp.c
  3. Cyrus SASL (GitHub) – issue #896: SRP server authentication bypass
  4. Cyrus SASL (GitHub) – commit fb3724f: Remove the SRP plugin
  5. oss-security – Unfixed vulnerabilities in Cyrus SASL (9 October 2026)
  6. Debian – debian/rules for the cyrus-sasl2 package
  7. Debian Security Tracker – CVE-2026-129483

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